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CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
Recently, the WTO was organized. It is expected that the organization may play a 
role to force countries to be more open. In a more open world, capital and technology are 
more likely to move across countries, and so firms in each country will have to be more 
and more concerned about producing and selling abroad. Generally, international trade 
decisions are made under uncertain conditions in foreign exchange. A change in exchange 
rate can aflfect international firms' profits through their production, trade, and investment. 
In addition, the major currencies have been very volatile in the last decades. Therefore, 
the firms producing at their foreign plants or selling abroad increasingly need to manage 
the volatility of exchange rates. 
Figure 1 shows the fluctuation of exchange rates in the U.S. dollar per major 
currencies fi'om 1968 to 1993. The Bretton Woods international monetary system, the 
fixed exchange rate system formalized in 1945 to provide a stable monetary fi"amework for 
international trade, worked reasonably well until the U.S. dollar became significantly 
overvalued in 1970 due to the large balance of payments deficits of the U.S. Most major 
countries temporarily adopted floating exchange rate system after the devaluation of the 
U.S. dollar in 1971, and many other countries adopted floating exchange rate system after 
the second devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1973. Afterwards the foreign exchange rates 
have fi'eely fluctuated over time, and foreign currency futures were introduced in 1972 at 
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Figure 1. Trends of the U.S. dollar per major currencies normalized from 
1968 to 1993.' 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with the sharp increase in exchange rate volatility 
resulting from the widespread adoption of floating exchange rates. 
Furthermore, there may be also price or demand uncertainty for both imported and 
exported goods. Since many internationally traded goods do not have futures, forward, or 
options markets, firms carmot hedge uncertain prices in those markets. In this situation, 
they may want to hedge the risks in the futures, forward, or option markets through 
foreign exchange. For these reasons, the multinational firms have increasingly used 
hedging instruments to protect against exchange rate risk.^ Therefore, the introduction of 
foreign exchange futures markets provides a good opportunity to hedge exchange rate 
risk. In this sense, analyzing the implications of hedging instruments to reduce exchange 
' Major currencies are France ftanc (FR), Germany deutschemark (GE), Japanese yen (JA), Canada dollar 
(CA), Italy lira (IT), and U.K. pound (IK). They are normalized in the following way, 
X = (X-mean)/standard deviation 
where x is the normalized exchange rate (dollar/ foreign currency) and X is the nominal exchange rate. 
* See Kawai and Zilcha (1986), and Broil and Wahl (1992). 
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rate risk can be a major concern to multinational firms, which produce and sell in foreign 
countries. 
A more open world provides multinational firms more chance to obtain flexibility 
in production by allowing them to open foreign plants. Thus, investment decisions of 
multinational firms become more important in this circumstance. Cost structures of both 
domestic and foreign plants and the variability of the exchange rate are key components in 
determining their foreign direct investment decisions. In addition, in most major 
industries, firms are not just price-takers, but they have monopolistic power in some 
degree in the domestic market and even in the world market. Thus, studying an 
imperfectly competitive market seems to be more realistic. 
B. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to analyze the production, hedging, and investment 
decision behavior of multinational firm (MNF) which produces and sells in domestic and 
foreign markets under exchange rate uncertainty, with monopolistic power in both 
markets. Assuming that some decisions are made under uncertainty, while other decisions 
are made after the resolution of uncertainty, I examine how the variability of the exchange 
rate influences the composition of production and the level of total output of the firm. I 
also examine how the firm's welfare changes under risk, and then investigate how these 
effects change when transportation costs exist. 
Since the volatility of the exchange rate makes the firm's profit unstable, it may use 
hedging instrument(s) to reduce risk. If the firm uses some hedging instrument(s), the 
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effects of the uncertainty may change. Therefore, assuming that futures markets are 
available, I will investigate how the efifects change and what the optimal futures position 
is. I expect that perfect hedging is not attained by using flitures markets alone because the 
assumption I made on the sequence of decisions makes the indirect profit function 
nonlinear in the random exchange rate, which does not allow perfect hedging with single 
hedging instrument.^ Since these effects are subject to the firm's attitude toward risk, I 
analyze them for risk neutrality and for risk aversion. I also study the issue of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the supply side. Before the firm produces abroad, it will 
examine whether opening a foreign plant as well as a domestic plant is more profitable 
than opening a home plant only. Once the firm decides to open a foreign plant, it needs to 
invest in the foreign country to build a plant. Thus, FDI is positioned in the center of 
concern when we consider the MNF. I will investigate how the firm makes its foreign 
direct investment decision when total output is fixed and when total output is price 
responsive. Finally I will examine how the variability of the exchange rate affects both 
firms* welfare if the MNF faces a local competitor in the foreign market. 
Previous research is reviewed in chapter n. In chapter HI, the effect of uncertainty 
on production is examined in the absence and presence of transportation costs. In chapter 
IV, I study how the presence of futures markets affects the allocation of production for 
the monopoly after I reexamine the separation theorem. I also characterize the optimal 
futures position in this chapter. The issue of foreign direct investment is analyzed in 
chapter V. 
^ See Moschini and Lapan (1992) 
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CHAPTER n. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recently there have been many contributions to the theory of international firms 
under stochastic exchange rates. How exchange rate risk affects the volume of trade has 
been examined in various situations. The role of hedging instruments also has been 
analyzed in previous research. Ethier (1973) and Baron (1976) analyzed the effect of 
uncertain exchange rate on the output and international trade decisions, and the effect of 
forward exchange on international trade. It was shown that a risk averse firm's 
production decision is independent of the firm's attitude toward risk and its subjective 
probability of the future spot exchange rate in the presence of a forward exchange market. 
This property, known as the separation theorem, has been extended in several ways. 
Kawai and Zilcha (1986) examined the trade behavior of a risk averse firm in the 
presence of exchange rate and commodity price uncertainties. They showed that the more 
risk averse firm produces less when the profit fiinctions are monotonically increasing in the 
joint-product of two random variables. They also verified the separation theorem and 
showed that the optimal forward-futures contracting is a full double-hedge, assuming that 
the forward foreign exchange market is unbiased and the forward foreign exchange and 
commodity futures markets are jointly unbiased.'* Moreover, they investigated the role of 
the existence of both forward exchange and commodity futures markets in comparison to 
* In their paper, unbiased forward mailcet is characterized by E[ R] = Rj-, and "jointly unbiased" 
forward-futures markets are characterized by E[RP] = Rj-Pj- where R is  the random exchange rate,  P 
is the price of the commodity, R^ is the forward exchange rate, and is the futures price of the 
commodity. 
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the case where only one or no market is available. They found that the existence of 
forward exchange and commodity futures markets increases the volume of international 
trade. Paroush and Wolf (1986) reexamined the properties of separation and full hedging 
even in the presence of basis risk under commodity price uncertainty when forward and 
futures markets are available. They showed that when the agent hedges in the futures 
markets with basis risk, her or his production decisions are risk free due to additional 
hedging opportunities in the forward market. Wolf (1995) examined a competitive firm's 
import, production, and hedging decisions under input price and exchange rate 
uncertainties in a flexible exchange rate regime. He found that risk aversion and the 
variance of the exchange rate have a negative impact on imports, while their effect on 
hedging decision depends on the nature of the equilibrium price structure - on whether one 
faces a contango or backwardation - as well as on the initial magnitude of hedging. He 
also showed that imports of the input and hedging are lower under both input price and 
exchange rate uncertainty than under just exchange rate uncertainty if the input price in the 
first case is not smaller than that in the second case. Unlike most of the other research in 
this area, Katz (1984) examined the separation theorem under the imperfectly competitive 
forward market, and showed that the firm's production decision is not independent of the 
parameters affecting the firm under uncertainty. 
Zilcha and Eldor (1991) studied the behavior of a competitive risk-averse firm 
which faces uncertain exchange rate in a multiperiod framework. They showed that the 
firm's optimal capital/labor ratio declines in all periods in the presence of unbiased forward 
markets and these ratios are independent of the utility function and its subjective beliefs. 
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However, in terms of the absolute level of capital and labor, the usual separation theorem 
does not hold since the employment of the variable input in the future periods, and thus its 
production, remains uncertain. In addition, they showed that in the unbiased forward 
exchange market the firms tend to overhedge in both time periods when the exchange 
rates are positively correlated overtime. Donoso (1995) investigated how introducing a 
perfectly competitive and possibly biased forward currency market affects the export and 
hedging decisions of a risk-averse exporting firm in a multiperiod firamework under 
exchange rate risk. He found that the separation between exporting and hedging decisions 
holds at all time periods in a perfectly competitive forward currency market. Therefore, 
exporting decisions are independent of the distribution of the stochastic spot exchange 
rates, implying that exchange rate stabilizing policies will have no impact on exporting 
decisions in the presence of a forward currency market. He also showed that the 
introduction of a biased forward currency market does not always lead to an increase in 
the volume of exports. This result is most substantially different fi-om the others in terms 
of an unbiased forward currency market. 
Most papers in these studies assumed that there exists a competitive, risk-averse 
firm. However, some papers, such as Eldor and Zilcha (1987) and Broil and Zilcha 
(1992), analyzed an imperfectly competitive commodity market. I will describe these 
articles in detail. 
Eldor and Zilcha (1987) examined a price discriminating firm, producing only in 
the home country and always exporting, which is a monopoly in the domestic market but a 
price-taker on the foreign market under exchange rate uncertainty. Since they assumed 
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that the production decision is made under uncertainty, but the sales decision is made after 
the exchange rate is known, the profit function in their model is nonlinear in the exchange 
rate. They showed that exchange rate uncertainty reduces the optimal output of the price 
discriminating firm, and that the optimal output and export decreases with the increase in 
the firm's risk aversion. In the presence of forward foreign exchange markets, they 
showed that the optimal forward hedge of the price discriminating firm is lower than that 
of a competitive firm. They also verified that the separation theorem holds even for a 
price discriminating firm. 
Broil and Zilcha (1992) analyzed the implications of foreign exchange futures 
markets in the context of a risk-averse multinational firm with monopoly power in 
domestic and foreign markets, which produces and sells in both markets, under exchange 
rate uncertainty. Assuming that all decisions are made before exchange rate uncertainty is 
resolved, they investigated the effects of exchange rate uncertainty and the role of futures 
markets on the international production, sales, and direct investment. Given the von 
Neumann-Morgenstem utility, the firm chooses the levels of production, sales, and futures 
contracts in both countries in order to maximize its expected utility of profits. Assuming 
that foreign currency futures markets are available, the profit function is described as 
Y[ = R(y)->reR(x-irx-y)-C(x)-eC(x)-¥z(ej^-e) 
where y = x+x-y\s sales in the foreign market, x is the output, y is domestic sales, R(y) 
is the domestic revenue function, C(x) is the cost function, z is the amount of futures 
currency commitment, is the forward exchange rate which is given, and e is the 
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stochastic spot exchange rate whose distribution fimction is known. In the absence of any 
hedging instrument, they found that exchange rate uncertainty leads to lower domestic 
production and higher foreign production, and higher domestic sales and lower foreign 
sales. They also investigated the hedging behavior of the firm and the separation theorem 
in the presence of fiitures markets. Th^ showed that the optimal levels of the allocation 
of outputs and sales of the firm are independent of its attitude towards risk and the 
distribution fimction of the random exchange rate, implying that the separation theorem 
holds for this model. For the unbiased case (e^ = e), the firm hedges such that the profits 
are totally independent of the realization of the exchange rate. However, they found that 
if the forward exchange rate is biased (e^ ^ e), the hedging behavior depends on the 
attitude towards risk and the distribution fimction of the random exchange rate. The firm 
h e d g e s  m o r e  ( l e s s )  t h a n  i t s  n e t  r e v e n u e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  a s  >  e  ( a s  <  e ) .  
Furthermore, they showed that perfect hedging with fiitures market can be made under the 
single source of risk fi'om the exchange rate because the assumption made on the sequence 
of decisions leads to a linear profit fijnction in the random exchange rate. 
However, if there exists multiple sources of risk, the interaction among the sources 
of risk may lead to a nonlinear profit fimction in random variable. Another possibility for 
a nonlinear profit fimction can arise fi'om the sequence of decisions. In contrast to their 
assumption that all decisions are made before exchange rate uncertainty is resolved, if 
some decisions are made after the resolution of uncertainty, then the profit fimction would 
be nonlinear in the random variable. It may change the effect of uncertainty on the firm's 
10 
production decision. Furthermore, with nonlinear profit fimctions, using fixtures market 
alone as a hedging instrument will not lead to perfect hedging. In such cases, the 
separation theorem may not hold. 
Moschini and Lapan (1992) showed that perfect hedging by using fixtures market 
alone is not possible under output price risk because the sequence of decisions made in 
their model leads to a nonlinear profit fimction in random price. They assumed that the 
quasi-fixed input decision of a competitive firm is made under price risk, but output 
decision is made after output price uncertainty is resolved. With this assumption, they 
verified that the optimal quasi-fixed input level is larger under risk if the shadow price 
fimction of the quasi-fixed input is convex in output price. They also showed that the 
optimal fixtures hedge is a short position eqixal to the expeaed output with unbiased 
fixtures prices for the quadratic profit fixnction. In addition, they showed that the optimal 
level of the quasi-fixed input is not affected by expectations about the uncertain price but 
depends on the known fixtures price when the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input is 
linear in output price, implying that the separation theorem holds. 
Table 1 summarizes the differences on assumptions and results among these 
papers. The model in my study differs fi-om Moschini and Lapan (1992) in the sense that 
they considered a price-taking firm in a closed economy. I assume that under exchange 
rate uncertainty, a firm produces in the foreign plant as well as in the domestic plant, and 
sells with a monopolistic power in both markets. It also differs fi-om Eldor and Zilcha 
(1987) who examined a price discriminating firm, producing only in the home country and 
selling as a monopoly in the domestic market but a price-taker in the foreign market. 
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Table 1. Summaiy of previous research 
Eldor and Zilcha 
(1987) 
Broil and Zilcha 
(1992) 
Moschini and Lapan 
(1992) 
Sources of risk Exchange rate Exchange rate Output price 
Sequence of 
decisions 
Output decision 
made under risk, 
and sales decision 
made under 
certainty 
All decisions made 
under uncertainty 
Quasi-fixed input 
decision made under 
risk, but output 
decision made with 
certainty 
Nonlinearity of profit 
in random variable 
Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
Market structure Monopoly in 
domestic market, 
but perfect 
competition in 
foreign market 
Monopoly in both 
domestic and 
foreign markets 
Perfect competition 
in closed economy 
Availability of 
hedging instruments 
Forward foreign 
exchange market 
Futures foreign 
exchange market 
Commodity futures 
and options markets 
Results • Lower optimal 
output under risk. 
• The separation 
theorem holds. 
• Lower hedging 
level than a 
competitive firm. 
• Lower domestic 
and higher foreign 
productions. 
• The separation 
theorem holds. 
• Full hedges in the 
unbiased fiitures 
market. 
• Short position of 
the optimal futures 
hedge. 
• Perfect hedging 
with futures market 
alone is not possible. 
• The separation 
theorem holds. 
Therefore, in their paper, there is no issue about the allocation of production and foreign 
direa investment. The timing of decisions is a very important component in my model. I 
assume that some decisions are made under uncertainty, while other decisions are made 
after the resolution of uncertainty. This sequence of decisions makes my model different 
from Broil and Zilcha (1992). Since the assumptions in my model differ from the previous 
studies in various ways, the issues considered, the approach to solve them, and the results 
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will also be different. Furthennore, I examine some issues not considered in these 
previous studies, such as the existence of transportation costs and the issue of a strategic 
advantage in the FDI decision. 
I also review previous research for the issue of direct investment, particularly those 
papers which studied the effect of the variability in the exchange rate on the FDI decision. 
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) have examined the implications of exchange rate variability 
for foreign direct investment flows for a MNF in a two-period model. They assumed that 
the firm chooses its domestic and foreign capacities under exchange rate and foreign 
demand uncertainties, and produces at capadty only for foreign sales after the resolution 
of uncertainty. This assumption implies that capacity and production decisions are 
essentially the same, and are made in the first period. They also made the assumption on 
the cost structure as follows. In order to eliminate the ability of the producers to buy the 
option of channeling production ex post to the more profitable plant, all factors in 
production are fixed. In addition, capacity costs are equal to 1 per unit of domestic 
output, and equal to e per unit of output abroad so that e can be interpreted as the ratio of 
foreign production cost to domestic production cost where e is the exchange rate. They 
showed that a risk neutral firm is indifferent regarding the location of production facilities. 
They also argued that under risk aversion, it is desirable to locate all production in the 
foreign country with the positive correlation between exchange rate and foreign demand 
shocks, but it is desirable to have some domestic production with the negative correlation. 
In the presence of exchange rate uncertainty only, however, it is always desirable to locate 
some production abroad. An interesting result of their findings is that an increase in the 
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variability of exchange rates leads to the larger share of FDI, but the change in the 
absolute level of FDI is ambiguous. 
The sequence of decisions made in my model differs from theirs in the sense that I 
assume that the investment decision is made before the resolution of the exchange rate, 
but production decision is made after the exchange rate is known. In addition, their cost 
structure differs from that in my model. There is no fixed cost in their model, while the 
model in my study has fixed costs. Thus, the firm in their model has no economy of scale. 
Because of the difference of the assumptions mentioned above, I expect that the results 
may differ from theirs. 
Bailey and Tavlas (1991) reviewed the arguments of proponents of managed 
exchange rates who believe that variable exchange rates impede investment. George Zis 
(1989) and IMF (1984) msisted that short-term volatility impedes direct investment, and 
John Williamson argued that long-term misalignment is harmful to direct investment. 
Also, Paul Krugman argued that exchange rate instability, which comes from reasonable 
market responses to change in policies and underlying conditions and from failures in the 
international financial markets, makes firms cautious and unwilling to change their 
production and pricing decisions, inhibiting direct investment. Bailey and Tavlas (1991) 
did not agree with the arguments of proponents of managed exchange rate. After they 
investigated the effects of the exchange rate variability (short-term volatility and long-term 
misalignment) on direct investment, they concluded that the effect of exchange rate risk on 
direct investment is ambiguous because increased risk may lead to a reduction of trade and 
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domestic investment and to an increase in foreign direct investment. Thqr also supported 
their argument with their empirical investigation. 
Cushman (198S) analyzed the efifects of real exchange rate risk and expectations 
on direct investment for four different cases, depending upon where to buy inputs and 
produce, where to finance capital acquisitions, and where to sell output; (i) foreign 
production and sale using foreign inputs financed at home or abroad, (ii) foreign 
production and sale with capital financed domestically and exported intermediate good to 
the foreign subsidiary, (iii) domestic production and sale with imported intermediate good 
from a foreign subsidiary whose capital is financed at home, (iv) domestic and foreign 
production but foreign sale only with capital purchased and financed at home or capital 
purchased abroad but financed at home. Assuming that an international firm makes its 
input decisions under exchange rate uncertainty, he found that the direct eflfect of risk is to 
lower foreign capital cost and thus to increase foreign direct mvestment. However, when 
the costs of other inputs are also afiFerted, induced productivity changes or output price 
changes may offset the direct eflfect, reducing foreign direct investment. 
Even though these theoretical studies found that the total effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty on the level of FDI is not clearly determined, there are some empirical studies^ 
showing that increases in exchange rate risk are positively and significantly related with 
foreign direct investment flows for some of the data collected. 
^ David Cushman (1985, 1988), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) 
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Broil and Zilcha (1992) investigated the effects of the presence of futures market 
on FDI that increases demand for the MNF product, such as advertisement. They proved 
that the introduction of an unbiased currency futures market leads to a higher FDI 
affecting the demand side rather than the technology in the foreign country, and also 
showed that FDI moves directly with the futures price. However, the firm in my study 
invests in supply side to reduce potential costs, such as building new plants in foreign 
country. 
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CHAPTER m. THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE UNCERTAINTY 
I consider a risk-averse multinational firm which produces and sells a 
homogeneous commodity in domestic and foreign markets under exchange rate 
uncertainty. The fiam has monopolistic power in both markets. Production decisions are 
made when the exchange rate is not known, while the sales decisions are made after the 
exchange rate is known with certainty. This sequence of decisions is critical in the analysis 
of the issues examined in this study because it makes the profit function nonlinear in the 
stochastic exchange rate. The firm chooses the optimal level of sales in both markets to 
maximize its profit after the exchange rate uncertainty is resolved, and the sales decision 
problem can be written as 
max n=P(Y)Y+eP(Y)Y-C(q)-eC(q), 
Y.Y 
S.t. 
Y+Y<q + q 
where P(.) is the inverse demand function, Y is the amount of domestic sales, e is the 
exchange rate measured as the home currency units per foreign currency unit, q is the 
amount of domestic production, and "—denotes the corresponding symbol for the 
foreign country. The cost fimctions in both countries, C(.) and C(.),aiQ assumed to be 
different and assumed to have positive and nondecreasing marginal costs; C'(.), C'(.)>0, 
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and C'C), C'(.) > 0. Assuming that all outputs are sold (i e., Y+Y =q+q),tiie 
maximization problem for the optimal sales decision can be rewritten as 
mca X[ = R(Y)-^eR(Q-Y)-C(q)-eC(q) 
Y.Y 
where Y = Q-Y, R(Y) = P(Y)Y, and R(Y) = F(f )f. 
The revenue functions, R(Y) and are assumed to have positive and nonincreasing 
marginal revenues, R'(X), W(Y^ > 0, and R'(Y), R'(Y )<0. For positive values of 
sales in both markets, the first order condition of this problem is 
R'(Y)-eR'(Q-Y) = 0. (3-1) 
This implies that marginal revenues must be equalized between the domestic and foreign 
sales at the optimum. From equation (3-1), the optimal levels of sales are obtained as 
functions of Q and e, 
Y* = Y*(Q.e) 
Y* = Y*CQ.e). 
Note that there is no risk in this optimal sales decision. Equation (3-1) provides the 
relationship between sales and the exchange rate. Totally differentiating equation (3-1) 
provides the following expression; 
^ = R'(R' + R')~' <0. 
oz 
The optimal domestic sales is negatively related to the exchange rate. It also can be 
determined that the optimal foreign sales is positively related to the exchange rate.® 
' From S - Y(Q,e)* Y(Q.e),^  = -  ^
OS <x 
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Using the optimal levels of sales, the production decision problem is solved under 
exchange rate uncertainty. At this stage of analysis, it is assumed that hedging instruments 
are not available. Using the von Neumann-Morgenstem utility where U'>0 and U' <0, 
this problem can be written as 
mca E[U(U.)J 
9.9 
s.t. 
Y[ = R(Y*)+eR(Q-Y*)-C(q)-eC(q), 
Y* = Y*(Q,e), Y* = Y*(Q ,e) ,3Xi<iQ = q+q. 
It is assumed that the distribution of the exchange rate, e, is known. For positive values of 
q and q, the first order conditions for this maximization problem can be derived as 
dEfUfVi)] - dY* 
dEfUdi)] - dY* — L nuj ^ E[U'-(R'—+eR'-(l-—)-eC)] = 0. 
Using equation (3-1), these can be simplified as 
^[UOi)] 
dq 
^[uai)] 
= E[U' •(eR'-C')J = 0 (3-2) 
= E[U'-(eR'-eC)] = 0. (3-3) 
I investigate the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on output decision in the 
absence of transportation costs in the first two sections of this chapter, and then examine 
the effect in the presence of transportation costs in the last section. As I reviewed in 
chapter 2, Broil and Zilcha (1992) showed that a risk averse firm with linear profit 
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function produces less at home and more abroad under exchange rate uncertainty in the 
absence of hedging instrument. The profit fimction in their model is linear in the exchange 
rate because they assumed that all decisions are made before the resolution of exchange 
rate uncertainty, which is the only source of risk. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
sequence of decisions assumed in my model makes the profit fimction nonlinear in the 
exchange rate. Although the sequence of decisions in my model is dififerent fi'om that in 
the linear model, the effects of the uncertainty on the allocation of outputs between the 
domestic and foreign markets for a risk averse firm are the same as those in the linear 
model, holding total output constant. For a risk neutral firm, however, uncertainty has no 
effect on the allocation of outputs. 
I also analyze the effect on total output for a risk neutral firm, and verify that the 
risk neutral firm is better off under uncertainty, regardless of the optimal level of total 
output. The effect on total output depends on the type of demand functions. The firm's 
total production is lower under uncertainty with linear demand, but higher with constant 
elasticity demand. 
On the other hand, if there exist transportation costs, the firm's production 
decisions are changed. A risk neutral firm will, in general, produce more at home under 
uncertainty than under certainty in the presence of transportation costs, while uncertainty 
has no effect on the allocation of production in the absence of transportation costs. Also, 
the firm is likely to trade less in the presence of transportation costs. 
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A. Absence of transportation costs 
Assuming that there exists no transportation cost, I analyze the effect of the 
exchange rate uncertainty on production in this section. I first «camine this effect on the 
allocation of outputs for the risk neutral firm and for the risk averse firm, and then on the 
level of total outputs for the risk neutral firm. Finally I analyze how uncertainty affects the 
risk neutral firm's welfare. 
1. The effect on the allocation of outputs 
As I mentioned before, a risk averse firm produces less in the domestic plant and 
more in the foreign plant under uncertainty, given total output unchanged. However, a 
risk neutral firm makes the same allocation of outputs under uncertainty as under 
certainty. In the absence of transportation cost, I show this effect for risk aversion first, 
and then prove it for risk neutrality. The effect for a risk averse firm can be verified in the 
following manner. 
Using equations (3-1), (3-2), and (3-3), we obtain 
C'(q*)E[U'] = C'(^)E[U'e J (3-4) 
where q* and ^ are the optimal allocation of production between the domestic and 
foreign markets under uncertainty . Given the profit fiinction, 
n = R(y) + eR(Y) -C(q) -eC(q), I also derive C'E[U'e] < eC'E[U'] where 
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E[e]=e? Together with equation (3-4), this inequality provides 
C'E[U']<eC'E[U']. 
Since the marginal utility is assumed to be positive, this can be reduced to 
C'(q*)<eC'(r') (3-5) 
for the uncertainty case. For the deterministic case, equation (3-4) becomes 
C(q')=eC'(r ) (3-6) 
where the superscript c denotes the optimal outputs under certainty. I can now prove the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3-1. Holding the level of total production unchanged, exchange rate 
uncertainty results in lower domestic production and higher foreign production for the 
risk averse firm, q*(Q)<q'(Q) cmdq*(Q)>q'(Q). 
PROOF. Let's assume q* < q". Equations (3-5) and (3-6) together with q* < q' 
implies C'iq*)<eC'(^)<eC'(q'')=C'(q'), given C'>0. However, C'(q*) <C'iq') 
implies q* <q', given C'>0. Under the assumption that Q is fixed, that contradicts the 
assumption, q* < q". It proves q* < q' and q* > q'. Q.E.D. 
This proposition shows that a risk averse firm produces less in the domestic plant 
and more in the foreign plant under exchange rate uncertainty, given unchanged total 
dVi - _ 
Assume that foreign net revenue is positive for all e > 0, —— - R(Y )-C(q)> 0. Using 
de 
dX\ cU' dU 
> 0 and the assumption of C/' < 0,1 obtain = U'—z— < 0, and thus cov(U',e) < 0. 
Then I get ^[Ve J < (E[U'])(E[e J) from cov(U',e) = EfU'e ] - (E[U' ])(E[e ])<0. 
Therefore, C'E[U'e]<eC'E[U'] where C'>0. 
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output. It implies that the firm moves some of its production from the home plant to the 
foreign plant to avoid exchange rate risk. When the firm engages in international trade, it 
faces risk from the variability of the exchange rate which makes its profit unstable. In 
order to avoid risk and to make the profit more stable, the risk averse firm may want to 
increase the foreign production, instead of producing at home and exporting. 
However, a risk neutral firm produces the same amounts of output at home and 
abroad under uncertainty as under certainty. The variability of the exchange rate does not 
affect the levels of the domestic and foreign production. This can be easily shown as 
follows. Equation (3-4) reduces to 
C'(qV=eC'(q*) (3-7) 
for a risk neutral firm, while equation (3-6) becomes C'(q")= eC'(q'') for the 
deterministic case. These two equations are exactly the same. Since q * and q" solves the 
same equation, given total output constant, they must be the same level. Therefore, 
q* = q" and q* = q', given total output unchanged. 
2. The effect on total output 
In this section, I analyze how the uncertainty affects the level of total output for 
the risk neutral case (11"= 0) in the absence of transportation cost. The effect on total 
output depends on the type of demand in this case. I analytically show this effect for some 
specific types of demand when the firm is risk neutral. 
23 
The optimal solutions for sales and the allocation of outputs can be derived by 
solving the first order conditions of the sales and production decision problems.' 
Substituting equation (3-1) into equation (3-2), I obtain the following equation, 
E[U'-(R'(Y)-C'(q))] = 0. 
For risk neutrality, this can be rewritten as 
EfRrr * (Q,e)) - C'(q *(Q.e))J = 0, (3-8) 
after substituting the optimal solutions for sales and the domestic output back mto the 
equation. The optimal total output under uncertainty, O*, solves equation (3-8). Let's 
define a fiinction y as 
J(& = ^ ^^^^=E[R(Y'(Q.e»-C(q*(Q.e))]' 
oQ 
Then, the evaluation of the function J(Q) at Q* equals zero by the definition of the 
maximization problem, 
J(Q*)=E[R'(Y*(Q*e))-C(q*(O*.e))]=0. 
In order to compare to the output level under certainty, Q", I evaluate the function 
J(Q) at 0^; 
 ^ For the risk neutral firm, the first order conditions of the production decision problem becomes 
E[eR'(Y)-C'(q)] = 0 aa(iE[eR'(Y) — eC'(q)] = 0. It can be reduced to 
E[C'(q) — eC'(q)J = 0 or C'(q) — eC'(Q—q) = 0. Thus, the optimal allocation of outputs is a 
function oftotal output and the mean ofthe exchange rate (e), q* = q*(Q,e) andq* = q*(Q,e). 
 ^The indirect objective function of the production decision problem becomes a function of Q,e, and the 
distribution of e. Using the envelope theorem, the first derivative of the indirect expeaed profit function 
^fUCQ.eJJ 
with respect to total output turns out to be — = E[R'(Y(Q,e)) — C'(q(Q,e ))]. 
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J(Q')=E[R'(Y*(Q\e))-C'(q'(Q%e))]=E[R'(Y*(Q',e))-R'(Y''(Q'.e))] 
because R'(Y*(Q^,e)) = C'(q''(Q',e )) for the deterministic case. The optimal levels of 
sales and the domestic production of the risk neutral firm, Y*(Q*, e) and C'(q*(Q*.e)), 
a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  s a m e  r u l e s  a s  u n d e r  c e r t a i n t y ,  Y * ( Q ' . e )  a n d  C ' { Q ' . e ) ) ,  
respectively. Since ^ < 0 by the second order condition of the 
oQ aQ 
production decision problem,'" the following statement can be obtained. 
The evaluation oiJ(Q) at Q' provides 
J(Q')^0 as ElR'iYiQ\e))\^R'(YiQr,e)), i.e., 
E{R\Y(Q\em-R%YiQ',e)) as 
by Jensen's inequality. Thus the sign of the second derivative of the domestic marginal 
revenue with respect to the exchange rate must be determined to compare with Q*\ 
> R' > 
i.e., Q*—Q^ as 0. By taking the first derivative of the domestic marginal revenue 
< ce' < 
function, R'(Y(Q'.e)), with respect to the exchange rate, we can obtain 
—=——=R''R'-(R'+eR')-' 
di dY dz 
dY 
where — = R' (R' + eR')~' <0. Then the second derivative is obtained as de 
10 e'EOVQ.e)! r-S.,^0 
cQ' - CQ '^  CQ' 
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^ 2  - R  ( ^ )  + R  ^ 2  
= (R'+eR')-^ -r[eR' • (R'R'+R'R') - 2R'R' • (R' + eR')J. 
oz 
where ^=-(R'+eR'')-' ^ (R'+R'+(R''-eR')^). 
oi dz OS 
The sign of the second derivative of the domestic marginal revenue with respect to the 
exchange rate depends on the shape of the marginal revenue fimctions, R' and R', given 
the prior assumptions that the marginal revenues are positive but nonincreasing, 
R'(Y)>0, R'(Y)>0, R'(Y)<0, and R '(Y )^0. Thus, the second derivative of the 
domestic marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate cannot be generally signed 
without using a specific function for demand. If the marginal revenue functions are non-
a^^R' 
convex, R',R'' <0^xhe second derivative ^ will be negative and thus total output 
will be less under uncertainty than under certainty. However, if the marginal revenue 
functions are convex, R',R''>0, then the sign of the second derivative is ambiguous, and 
so is the effect on total output. Specifically, I examine this effect for two different types 
of demands, linear demands and constant elasticity demands. The effect of uncertainty on 
total output for these particular cases can be described as in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3-2. If the demand functions in both markets are linear, then the risk 
neutralfirm produces less under uncertainty than under certainty, Q'>Q*. However, if 
the demand functions in both markets have constant elasticity, then the firm produces 
more under uncertainty than under certainty, Q''<Q*. 
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PROOF. With the linear demand functions in both markets, we can simplify the 
second derivative of the domestic marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate as 
-2R'R'R' • (R'+eR')-'. 
as 
3'R' 
This expression is negative, < 0. Thus, as argued previously, J(Q') < 0 and hence 
aj 
given—<0. 
oQ, 
On the other hand, when the demand fimctions have constant elasticity, the second 
derivative of the domestic marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate is positive. 
Inverse demand fimctions for the domestic and foreign markets can be expressed as 
P = aY~^ and P = where a,a > 0, and <1. 
With these specific demand functions, I obtain the following expressions, 
R' = a(l-P)Y-P, R'^-jR', 
R' = a(l-p)Y-^ = -R', R" = -^R\ and R" = 
e ei eY 
We can see that the marginal revenue functions are convex, R'',R'>0. Using these 
expressions, the second derivative can be written and signed as 
^  =  0 [ f i ( I - p ) Y Y + f i ( t - p ) Y ' ] > 0  
where 0 = 6'' fi(R'f R 'Y'^ Y (fiY + fiY)'' (R"+eR')'' > 0. The positive second 
R' dJ derivative, . ^ > 0, implies J(Q') > 0 and hence Q' <Q*, given — < 0. Q.E.D. 
as dQ 
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After all, the risk neutral firm produces less under uncertainty if the marginal 
revenue functions are non-convex, but more if the demand fimctions are constantly elastic. 
Otherwise, the effect on total output is ambiguous. 
3. Firm's welfare 
Regardless of the optimal level of total output, it will be shown that the welfare of 
the risk neutral firm is greater under uncertainty than under certainty, because the indirect 
profit function is convex in the exchange rate. That is, its expected profit with exchange 
rate risk, E[X[*(Q*,e)], is greater than its profit with certainty, Q'.e), where the 
functions are described as 
E[U*(Q*.e)J = E[R(Y*(Q*e))+eR(Q*-Y*(Q*e))-C(q*)-eC(Q*-q*)J, 
W(Q\e) = R(r(Q\e))+eR(Q^-r(Q\e))-C(q')-eC(Q'-q'). 
This result can be stated by the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3-3. Exchange rate risk always increases the expected profit of the risk 
neutralfirm. 
PROOF. Evaluating the expression for the expected profit of the risk neutral firm at 
Q', we obtain 
E/U*(Q',e)J = E[R(Y*(Q\e))+eR(Q'-Y*(Q\e))-C(q*)-eC(Q'-qV] 
where q*(Q') = q'. By the definition of maximization problem, Q* provides the 
maximum level of the expected profit. Thus, the evaluation of the expected profit at Q" 
cannot be greater than the evaluation at Q*, 
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E[U*(Q\e)]> E[Tl*(Q\e)]. 
Also, I obtain EIJ[*(Q',e)]^W(Q''J) as by Jensen's inequality. 
Therefore, the comparison depends on the sign of the second derivative of the indirect 
profit function with respect to the exchange rate. Using the envelope theorem, I derive 
^=R-C and 
ds de 
where —=R'- (R' + R')~'. Since the indirect profit function is convex in the exchange 
rate, I conclude that the risk neutral firm is always better off with risk, 
E[U*(Q*e)]> W(Q\e). Q.E.D. 
B. Existence of transportation costs 
I have assumed that there is no transportation cost in the previous analysis. I relax 
this assumption and investigate the firm's trade and production behaviors. With the 
existence of transportation costs, the firm has additional costs when it engages in trade. 
Since the costs make trade expensive, the volume of trade is likely to shrink. I examine 
how the existence of transportation costs afifects the firm's trade and output decisions in 
the presence of exchange rate risk. Again, it is assumed that there is no hedging 
instrument. Also, the sequence of the firm's decisions is assumed to be the same as 
before. The existence of transportation costs alters the firm's profit function to 
n = R(Y)+eR(Y)-C(q)-eC(q)-tX-tX 
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where Y = q-X-^JC, 7 = q-k-X-X, Q = q+q, / is a transportation cost per unit of 
product traded, Xis the volume of product exported to the foreign market, and X is the 
volume of product imported into the domestic market (^X > 0 and X>0). Following 
similar procedures as before, the sales decision problem in the existence of transportation 
cost can be described as 
mca U = R(q-X+X) + eR(Q-q + X-X)-C(q)-eC(Q-q)-tX-tX 
x,x 
S.t. 
X>0, X>0. 
Since exports and imports are non-negative, there might be comer solutions. The first 
order conditions of this problem can be written as 
^ = -Rrq-X+XJ+eRrQ-q + X-X)-t<0 
OA 
^=R'(q-X+X)-eR'(Q-q^X-X)-t<0. 
In order to investigate the trade behavior of the firm, the first order conditions are 
evaluated X = X = 0, 
cX 
an 
dX 
= -R'(q)+eR'(Q-q)-t, 
x=x=o 
= R'(q)-eR'(Q-q)-t. 
x=x=o 
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. .. Note that if sx: x=x=o 20, then x=x=a 
<0 for t > 0, and if 
oX 
> 0 ,  then 
X=X=0 
dK 
.0 for t>0. Thus, there are three possible cases that might be optimal. 
x=x=o 
n ^ > 0 and —= 
x=x=o 
^0, Gi) 
x=x=o 
<0  and —^ 
x=x=o dK 
> 0 ,  and 
x=x=o 
..... <0 and —:= 
x=x=o 
<0. 
x=x=o 
These cases can be summarized as follows; 
>0, R'(q)-eR'(0-q)<-t, then X>0 and X = 0, and 
x=x=o 
Absolves R'(q-X)-eR'(Q-q + X) + t = 0. 
>0, R'(q)-eR'(Q-q)>t, then X = 0 and X>0, and 
x=x=o 
X so\\ts R'(q + X)-eR'(Q-q-X)~t = 0. 
(iii) ^-t <R'(q)-eR'(Q-q)<t, then X = X = 0. 
From these equations, the optimal level of exports and imports can be expressed as a 
function ofQ, q, e, and t, X*= X*(Q,q,e,t) and X* = X*(0,q,ej). These first order 
conditions imply that the firm engages in one-way trade; that is, exporting and importing 
at the same time {X >0 and A' > 0) are not optimal in this model. Using these optimal 
solutions for trade, the firm's production decision problem can be written as 
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max E[U(U.)] 
q 
s.t. 
U = R(q-X*^X*)-^eR(Q-q+X*-X*)-C(q)-eC(Q-q)-tX*-iX*, 
X* = X*(Q.q,e.t) and X* = X*(Q,q,e,t). 
For positive value of the domestic production, the first order condition of this problem is 
expressed as 
^[ugp] 
dq 
= E[U' • (R'(q - X * +X*) - eR'(Q -q + X*-X*) - C'(q) + eC'(Q -q))J = 0 (3-9) 
by using the envelope theorem. The optimal level of the domestic production (^ *) is 
determined by solving equation (3-9), and the optimal level of the foreign production {q *) 
is determined in the equation q*-Q-q*, given total output. 
1. The eflfect on trade behavior 
It is expected that the existence of transportation costs discourages the firm fi-om 
engaging in trade because transportation cost raises the costs of trade. The presence of 
transportation cost provides less opportunity for the firm to trade because it costs more to 
the firm. The first order conditions of the sales decision problem provide that 
no export but positive import if R'(q)-eR'(0-q)> t, 
no trade if-/ < R'(q)-eR'(0-q) < /, 
positive export but no import if R'( q)-eR'(Q-q)<-t. 
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By rewriting the first and third cases above, I obtain the foUowings; 
X - 0 < X  and X solves R'(q + X)-eR'(Q-q-X)-t = 0 if e<e,, (3-10) 
= andXsolves R'(q-X)-eR'(Q-q-^X)-^t = 0 (3-11) 
where ej(q) is defined as the value oieat X = 0 satisfying equation (3-10), 
^ and as the value of e at X = 0 satisfying equation (3-11), 
e2(q) - Then, I compare e, with to ensure that is greater than for 
2t 
all positive transportation costs, e - e. - ot/rt i" ^ result provides that the K({J-q) 
firm imports (exports) if the domestic (foreign) marginal revenue is greater than the 
foreign (domestic) marginal revenue after compensating transportation cost, e<e, 
{e > Bj). However, the firm would not trade if neither marginal revenues can compensate 
for transportation cost, i.e., if the difference between the domestic and foreign marginal 
revenues is less than transportation cost (e, <e<e^)-
If there exists no transportation cost, equations (3-10) and (3-11) becomes 
X = 0 < X and X solves R'(q + X)-eR'(Q-q-X) = 0 if e<eg, (3-12) 
X > 0 = A" and A!" solves R'(q-X)-eR'(Q-q + X) = Oife>eg (3-13) 
where e^fq) is the value of e at X = A!" = 0 in the absence of transportation cost, 
eo(q) = • The firm will import (not trade, or export) if the domestic marginal 
^ (Q-9) 
revenue is greater than (equal to, or less than) the foreign marginal revenue. 
" 6; satisfies R'(q) — eR'(Q — q) = t, and e,satisfies R'(q)-eR'(Q-q) = -i 
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Figure 2. Relationships between trade and the exchange rate 
e<egie = e^, or e > eg). These relationships are represented in Figure 2. The line (3-10) 
and (3-11) represent the relationship between trade and the exchange rate in the presence 
of transportation costs, while the line (3-12) and (3-13) explain it in its absence. As we 
can see in Figure 2, the bottoms of the line (3-12) and (3-13) meet each other at eg. There 
is no trade only at Cg in the absence of transportation costs because the domestic and 
foreign marginal revenues are equalized at . In the presence of transportation costs, 
however, the firm will import (not trade, or export) \fe<e, (e, <e<e,,OT e> e^). It 
indicates that the introduction of transportation costs changes the firm's trade behavior in 
the following manner. In the absence of transportation cost, the firm maximizes its profit 
by trading except when e = The firm has no incentive to trade only at the point of Cg 
that provides that the domestic and foreign marginal revenues are the same. However, 
there exists a domain on e at which the firm has no incentive to trade in the presence of 
transportation costs, Cj < e < where < eg < e^. In this domain, the firm does not 
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want to trade because transportation costs are greater than the benefit fi'om trade. 
Therefore, the firm is likely to trade less in the presence of transportation costs. 
2. The effect on the allocation of outputs 
In section A of this chapter, I have studied how uncertainty affects the allocation 
of outputs in the absence of transportation costs. Without transportation costs, holding 
total output constant, a risk neutral firm produces the same amounts at home under 
uncertainty as under certainty, while a risk averse firm expands foreign production under 
uncertainty. Also, we can see how a change in the value of transportation costs affects the 
allocation of production under certainty. Under certainty, if the firm exports to the foreign 
country (i.e., X >0), it produces less at home and more abroad when transportation costs 
increase. We can see this by examining the first order condition of the production decision 
problem.'^ By totally differentiating the first order condition for the case of exporting 
dq 1 
under certainty, we obtain — = ~ ^indicates that the existence of 
12 In the deterministic case, the first order conditions and the firm's trade behavior can be described as 
follows. From the first order conditions of the sales decision problem, 
X = O ^ X  and X solves R'(q+X)—eR'(Q—q—X)—l = 0 if R'(q) — eR'(Q — q) >t{e <«;), 
X>0 = A'andA!'solves R'(q-X)—eR'(Q—q+X)+t = 0 if R'(q)-eR'(Q-q) < -t {€>6^), 
X=X=0 \I-t <R'(q)-eR'(Q-q) <t {e, <e <e^). 
And the first order condition of the output decision problem is = R' — eR' — C + eC'=0. 
Using the first order condition of the sales decision problem, it can be written as 
C'(q) — eC'(Q — q) = t whene<e;, 
C'(q)—eC'(Q — q) = —t when e > e^. 
R'(q)-eR'(Q-q)-C'(q)+eC'(Q-q) = 0 whene, <e <6^ 
where e, and are flmctions of total output, e, (Q) and ^^(Q). 
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transportation costs reduces the domestic production in the deterministic case because the 
firm does not want to pay more when it ©cports. 
Now, I investigate how the existence of transportation costs changes the firm's 
production behavior under uncertainty. It will be shown that given total output 
imchanged, a risk neutral firm produces more domestically under uncertainty than under 
certainty when transportation costs exist, assuming that the firm exports under certainty. 
However, whether a risk averse firm produces more or less domestically under uncertainty 
in the existence of transportation costs is not unambiguously determined. The effect of 
the existence of transportation costs on the allocation of outputs is investigated by 
examining the first order condition of the output decision problem. By using the 
integration expressions, equation (3-9) becomes 
• (t - C'(qV+eCrQ - qV)lg(e)de 
• (mv - ««re - ?•; - cr?*;+«c rc - q'»ig(e)de 
*i',„.,lU- (-l-C(qV+eCrQ-qV)]g(e)de " (3-14) 
Using the first order conditions of the sales decision problems, 
= j^fU' • (R' - eR' - C + eC')]g(e)de 
= fj' [V • (R' - eR' - C + eC') ]g(e)de + • (R' - eR' - C + eC') ]g(e )de 
+i'jU'. (R' - eR' -C' + eC') Jg(e)de 
= t'"'' [U'(t- C(qV+eC'CQ - q*))]g(e)de 
• (R'(q*) - eR'(Q - qV - C(qV + eC'(Q - q*))]g(e)de 
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where q* is the optimal level of the domestic output imder uncertainty and g(e) is the 
density function of tiie exchange rate. The first order conditions of the sales decision 
problem are used to get equation (3-14). Since q* solves equation (3-9), the evaluation of 
cE[U(Yl)] ^ ^ • jg equal to zero. In order to compare q* with (f, I also evaluate 
cE[U(W)] ^ jg tjjg optimal level of the domestic output imder certainty, 
^[uai)j 
3q 
-'V'" [V'-0-C(q' )*ea(Q-q' ))]g(<!)die 
'0 
+lZ'^l[U'(R'(q')-eR'(Q-q')-C(q-)+ea(Q-q'))Ig(e)de 
- C(q')+eC-(Q-q'))]g(e)de. 
I examine the effect of the existence of transportation costs on the allocation of 
outputs when the risk neutral firm exports to foreign country under certainty 
(e > e/q'))}* The first order condition of the production decision problem in the 
deterministic case is C'(q') -eC'(Q- q') = -t when the firm exports." Substituting 
^'(q') = eC'(Q-q")-t and assuming risk neutrality, it can be written as 
The result for the case of e <e^(q") is symmetric with the case of c > e2(q^). The firm exports to 
foreign country ase>ej(q''), while the firm imports from foreign country d&eKejCq"). The latter 
can be considered as that the foreign plant of the firm exports firom the foreign country to the home 
country. For the case of e, <e < e ,^ transportation costs are high enough to make no trade. Thus, the 
effea of uncertainty on the allocation of outputs is ambiguous in this case. 
See footnote 12. 
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[2tHe-1)C'(Q-q' )Ig(e)de 
+!'''1'jRrq')-eR-(Q-9')+'+(e-e)CrQ-qVJg(e)de 
'l(1 ) 
+J" ,,[(e-e)C'(Q-q^)]g(e)de 
ejf? ) 
= fre>W» ) - '^ '(<2 -'f>*' Ig<e><le 
+C'ig(e-e)g(e)de. 
Assuming that g(e)>0 for some e<e^ (i.e., assuming that there is some e that will lead 
to no trade), this evaluation is positive because the first term is non-negative, the second 
term is positive, and the third term is zero."® Therefore, the evaluation of at 
^(U) 
q = q' is greater than that atq = q*, > 0  =  ^ai) 
dq . Assuming that the 
second order condition of the output decision problem is satisfied, this implies q*>q'. 
Thus, if the risk neutral firm exports under certainty (e > e^), it will produce more at the 
domestic plant under uncertainty than under certainty when transportation costs exist, 
provided that there is some positive possibility the exchange rate will be such that, for low 
e, it will not be optimal to export ex post. This result can be compared with that in the 
absence of transportation costs. As shown in section A of this chapter, in the absence of 
transportation costs, the risk neutral firm produces the same amount at the domestic plant 
Since -t < R'(q') — sR'(Q- q^) <t or 0 < R'(q')-eR'(Q — q') + t < 2t in this domain, 
the second term is positive. And the third term is zero because 
JgCe-eJg(eJde = !gegCeJde-efg g(e)de = \'^eg(e)de-e =e-e =0. 
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under uncertainty as under certainty, given total output constant. This is because the 
random exchange rate does not affect the optimal allocation of production of the risk 
neutral firm. Technically, the optimal levels of the allocation of production under 
uncertainty and under certainty are determined by the same rule for the risk neutral firm. 
In contrast to that, uncertainty leads the risk neutral exporting firm to expand the domestic 
production comparing with the deterministic case in the existence of transportation costs. 
If the firm is risk averse, the evaluation at q = q' becomes 
^[Uai)J 
3q 
= t'"' '[U'(2t+(e- e)C '(Q - q'= ))]g(e)de 
'0 
9' 
-mq')- 'R-(Q -q')* I+ (e- ?)C'(Q - q'))lg(e)<k 
*ll,^,[U'-(e-eK-(Q-q' )lg(e)de 
= 2lil'"''u-g(e)<k .(W(q')-eW(Q-q')+t)]g(e)de 
+Ctrv-(l-e)jg(ejde. 
Since we cannot unambiguously sign this expression, the effect of the uncertainty on the 
allocation of output is ambiguous. The risk averse firm may produce more or less in the 
domestic plant under uncertainty in the presence of transportation costs. 
In summary, the existence of transportation cost changes the firm's production 
decision as well as its trade behavior. The existence of transportation costs discourages a 
firm fi-om engaging in trade because it costs more to the firm. Given total output 
unchanged, a risk neutral firm produces more at the domestic plant under uncertainty than 
under certainty in the presence of transportation costs, while it produces the same amount 
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in the domestic plant under uncertainty as under certainty in the absence of transportation 
costs. Even though the effect for a risk averse firm is ambiguous, we can see at least that 
the firm's production decision has changed, in comparison to the case of no transportation 
cost in which a risk averse firm produces less in the domestic plant under uncertainty than 
under certainty. 
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CHAPTER IV. HEDGING PROBLEM 
When I studied the effect of exchange rate uncertainty in the previous chapter, I 
assumed that no hedging instnmient was available. In this chapter, I introduce foreign 
exchange futures markets to give agents an opportunity to reduce risk from the volatility 
of the exchange rate. I examine whether the separation theorem holds in this particular 
circumstance. Also, I investigate how the presence of foreign exchange fiitures markets 
changes the effect of uncertainty on outputs, and examine how the risk averse firm's 
welfare changes when futures markets are available. Then, I study what the optimal 
amount of futures contracts is for a risk averse firm. The rule of the timing of sales and 
production decisions is the same as before. The firm chooses the levels of sales according 
to the same rule, R'(Y)-eR'(Q-Y) = 0 and Y = 0-Y. However, the production 
decision problem is different because the profit function is changed. And the firm also 
chooses the optimal amount of futures contracts before the exchange rate is known. The 
production and hedging dedsion problems of the risk averse firm is described as 
max Efucnjj 
q.Q-h 
s.t. 
n = R(YV + eR(Q - YV - C(q) - eC(q) + h(e^ - e), 
Y* = Y*rQ.eJ, Y* = Y*(Q.e), mdQ = q^q 
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where h is the amount of futures currency sold, and is the deterministic futures 
exchange rate. We can derive the first order conditions of this problem as equations (3-2), 
(3-3), and 
=EfV-(e^-e)J=0. (4-1) 
The optimal allocation of production in the presence of fiitures markets is determined by 
solving equations (3-2), (3-3), and (4-1) simultaneously, given total output, Q = q^ +q^ 
where and q^ are the optimal domestic and foreign outputs in the presence of futures 
markets, respectively. Reducing equations (3-2), (3-3), and (4-1), I obtain 
C'(q^)=e^C'(q^). (4-2) 
This rule is the same as that in the deterministic case if the deterministic futures exchange 
rate is unbiased, 6^- = e. Thus, the optimal allocation of outputs in the presence of 
unbiased futures markets must be the same as that in the deterministic case. 
A. Separation theorem 
The separation theorem states that a risk averse firm's production decision is 
independent of the firm's attitude toward risk and its subjective probability of the 
exchange rate in the presence of futures markets. Many previous studies have shown that 
the separation theorem holds in various cases where the profit function is linear in the 
random variable; under multiple sources of uncertainty (Kwai and Zilcha (1986)), in the 
case of an unbiased price with the presence of basis risk (Paroush and Wolf (1986)), for a 
monopolistic multinational firm (Broil and Zilcha (1992)), in the multiperiod framework 
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with a perfectly competitive forward market (Donoso (1995)). However, some other 
studies have proved that the separation theorem does not hold in some cases; under an 
imperfectly competitive forward market (Katz (1984)), for the absolute levels of capital 
and labor in the presence of unbiased forward market even though it holds for the optimal 
capital-labor ratio in the multiperiod framework (Zilcha and Eldor (1991)). One 
interesting paper (Eldor and Zilcha (1987)) showed that the separation theorem holds for 
a price discriminating firm even with a nonlinear profit fiinction. However, in my study, I 
expect that it holds for the optimal allocation of production in the presence of fiitures 
markets, but not hold for the optimal total output. As mentioned in chapter 2, a major 
difference of my model from theirs is that the multinational firm in my study produces both 
in the home and foreign countries with monopolistic power in both markets, while the firm 
in their model, producing only in the home country, is a monopolist in the home market 
but a price-taker in the foreign market. 
In my model, the optimal allocation of output is independent of the firm's attitude 
toward risk and its subjective probability of the exchange rate, but the optimal total output 
depends on the type of utility function and the probability beliefs about the exchange rate 
when fiitures foreign exchange markets are available. That is, the separation theorem 
holds for the optimal allocation of production but not for the optimal level of total output. 
It can be shown as follows. Plugging =Q-q^ into equation (4-2), I obtain 
C X q ' )  =  e , C ' ( Q - q ' ) .  
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From this equation, the optimal domestic output is determined as a function of fixed total 
output and the deterministic futures exchange rate only. Therefore, and do not 
depend on the type of utility fiinction and the probability distribution of the exchange rate, 
qf - q^(Q,e^) and q^ =Q-q^(Q.Sf), implying that the separation theorem holds. 
Relaxing the assumption of fixed total output, the optimal level of total output, 
, is determined in equation (3-2) or (3-3) after plugging q^ = q^{Q,ef) and 
q^ =Q-q^(Q.Sf) back into those equations. Then, solves the equation 
E[U'(W )eR'(Y*(Q,e))]-C'(qUQ,e^))E[U'(W )] = 0 
where = R(Y*) + eR(Q-Y*)-C(q^)-eC(q^)+h(e^-e), 
Y* = Y*(Q.e), Y* = Y*(Q.e), q^ = q^(0,e^l and q^ = q^(0,e^). 
In this equation, we can see that depends on the utility function and the probability 
distribution of the exchange rate. Therefore, I conclude that the separation theorem holds 
for the optimal allocation of outputs, but not for the optimal level of total output in this 
nonlinear profit model. 
B. Presence of futures markets 
When a currency futures market is introduced, agents have more opportunity to 
reduce risk fi-om the volatility of the exchange rate since the firm can hedge against 
exchange rate risk on its exports in foreign exchange futures markets. This opportunity 
may lead the firm to produce more at home and export more, holding other things 
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constant, because one of the major reasons for an exporting firm to produce abroad is to 
avoid risk fi'om the exchange rate variability. 
In this section, I will examine the efifect of the presence of futures markets on the 
allocation of outputs, and also study how the effect of uncertainty on total output is 
changed if foreign exchange futures markets exist. I also analyze how the risk averse 
firm's welfare changes when futures markets are available. It will be demonstrated that 
the risk averse firm produces more domestically in the presence of fixtures markets than in 
the absence of those markets except for the upward biased case. I also show that the risk 
averse firm produces less under uncertainty than under certainty in the presence of futures 
markets when the marginal revenue functions are non-convex, R'^R" <0, or more when 
the demand functions are constantly elastic. In addition, I verify that the risk averse firm is 
better off with risk in the presence of unbiased foreign exchange futures markets. 
1. The effect on the allocation of outputs 
It was shown in chapter 3 that a risk averse firm produces less at home under 
uncertainty than under certainty, q* <q'. Now I examine how the presence of futures 
markets changes this effect for the risk averse firm. 
Given total output fixed, the following expression can be derived fi'om equation 
(4-2), using the assumption of positive marginal cost, 
C'(q^)—eC'(q^) as . (4-3) 
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Since we cannot directly compare with q*, I examine the impact of the existence of 
futures markets for unbiased and biased cases separately where q*(q *) and q^(q^) are 
the optimal domestic (foreign) outputs without and with futures markets. 
For the unbiased case, ej-= e, equation (4-3) becomes C'(q^) = ^ C'(q^) and we 
can think of q^ as q" because they are determined by the same rule. Then, I obtain 
exactly the same result as the one obtained in section A of chapter 3, using the same 
technique. That is, q*< q^ and q*>q^ can be derived from equation (3-5) and 
CXq^) = eC'(q^ ), given total output, Q = q* = q^ +q^. The risk averse firm 
produces more at home in the presence of unbiased futures markets than in the absence of 
them, given unchanged total output. 
On the other hand, for the biased case, the effect of uncertainty is changed in a 
different way. In order to compare q^ with q*, I will show that a higher deterministic 
futures exchange rate leads to higher domestic production in the presence of futures 
dq  ^
markets, —>0. The companson depends on how the futures exchange rate is biased, 
dej-
upward (ey< e) or downward {ej-> e). Equation (4-2) tells us that when increases, 
C'{q^) must increase to satisfy the equation, and thus q-^ increases with the assumption 
of positive and increasing marginal costs. This can be mathematically shown with 
equation (4-2), C'(q^) -efC'(Q-q^) = 0. Given total output constant, total 
differentiation of equation (4-2) provides 
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C'dq  ^+e^C'dq^-C'de  ^=0 or >0. 
This implies that the deterministic futures exchange rate and domestic production in the 
presence of futures markets move together. This result can now proceed to explain the 
impact of the presence of futures market on outputs for the biased case-
When the futures exchange rate is downward biased (or contango), e, 
increases because of a larger than that in the unbiased case (&/= e \ holding total 
output constant. That is, for the case of contango, the firm produces more domestically in 
the presence of futures markets, q*< and ^>q^. However, when the futures 
exchange rate is upward biased (or normal backwardation), ef<e,q^ decreases because 
of a smaller ej. than that in the unbiased case. Since this effect offsets the initial increase 
in domestic production due to the presence of unbiased futures markets, the impact of the 
presence of futures markets is indefinite, depending on how much q^ decreases with a 
smaller e^. Therefore, we can conclude that the optimal level of domestic production of 
the firm in the presence of futures markets will be higher than it is in the absence of futures 
markets except for the upward biased case. 
2. The effect on total output 
I have showed that exchange rate uncertainty differently affects the composition of 
outputs for the risk averse firm when currency futures markets exist. In this section, I 
study the effect on total output in the presence of currency futures markets. A risk averse 
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firm produces more or less under uncertainty in the presence of futures markets, 
depending on the curvature of the marginal revenue functions. That is, the introduction of 
futures markets may alter the effect of uncertainty on total output. 
PROPOSITION 4-1. Given unbiasedfutures markets, the effect of the presence of 
futures markets on total output depend on the curvature of the domestic marginal 
< d"^R' > 
revenue curve in the exchange rate, i.e., Q'—Q  ^ as ^ —0. If the marginal revenue 
curves are non-convex, R', R" <0, then Q^<Q'. However, if the marginal revenue 
curves are strictly convex, R", ^ ">0, then the effect on total output is ambiguous. 
Specifically, 
(a) if the demand functions are linear, then < Q. 
(b) if the demandfunctions are constant elasticity, then Q^>Q. 
From equations (3-1), (3-2), and (3-3), I derive the equation 
After plugging the optimal solutions for sales and the domestic output in the presence of 
futures markets back into the equation, this becomes 
Then the optimal level of total output in the presence of futures markets, , solves this 
equation. In order to compare with 0", I evaluate equation (4-4) at O' where Q' is 
the optimal level of total output under certainty. Assuming that the deterministic futures 
exchange rate is unbiased, ey = e, the evaluation at 0" can be expressed as 
E[U'-(R'(Y)-C'(q))] = 0. 
^[ugp] 
=EfU' • (R'(Y * (Q, e)) - C'(q^ (O, e^.)))] = 0. (4-4) 
^[ugp] 
=E[U'- (RmQ", e)) - R'(Y(Q'. e)))]. 
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using the first order condition of the production problem in the deterministic case, 
R'(Y(Q'',e)) = C'(q(Q'',e)). Then we can conclude that 
< ^[U(U)] Q^-Qf as >^^aE[ua[)] 
> dQ 
assimiing that the second order condition of total output decision problem is satisfied. 
Now define a function H as H(e)^ R'(y(• Using Taylor series expansion, the 
function H(e) can be expanded around the mean of the exchange rate as 
H(e) = H(e)+H,(e)-(e-e)+-^Hgg(e)(e-e)' where e e [e,e]. Then, the evaluation 
at Q" can be written as 
^fuai)j 
Therefore, 
^fuai)j 
or 
3Q ^0 as )~0, and thus as H„^0. It proves 
, d'R'(Y(0',e)) Q^-Q^ as ^—0, given HJe) = — 
> 
= E[U'-(H(e)-H(e))J 
c 
I 
=  E f U ' - ( H ( e )  +  H , ( e ) • ( e - e )  +  ^ H „ ( e ) - ( e - e /  - H ( e ) ) ]  
= E[V(e- e)JH.(e) + ^ E[VH„(e) • (e - ef ] 
= E[V(e-e,)lH,(e)+^E[U'H„(€).(e-e)' I=i^E[U'H„(e)(e-e)' ] 
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This turns out to be the same result as derived in section B of chapter 3. As shown there, 
the second derivative of the domestic marginal revenue function with respect to the 
exchange rate is described as 
S^R' — — — — — — 
—r-=(R' + eR—[eR'(R'R' + R'R ') - 2R'R '(R' + eR')]. 
OS oe 
The sign of this expression depends on the curvature of marginal revenue fimctions, R' 
and R'. If the marginal revenue curves are non-convex, the second derivative of the 
domestic marginal revenue with respect to the exchange rate will be negative, and thus the 
optimal level of total output will be less under uncertainty in the presence of futures 
markets than under certainty. For example, if the demand functions are linear, then the 
marginal revenue functions are also linear, R''=R''=Q, and the second derivative becomes 
negative. Therefore, the firm produces less under uncertainty in the presence of futures 
markets than under certainty. On the other hand, if the marginal revenue curves are 
strictly convex, then the second derivative can be positive, negative, or equal to zero, and 
so the effect on total output is ambiguous. However, if the demand functions are constant 
d'^R' 
elasticity, then the second derivative eventually turns out to be positive, , >0, even 
oe 
though the marginal revenue functions are strictly convex. Therefore, the optimal level of 
total output in the presence of futures markets is greater under uncertainty than under 
certainty with constant elasticity demands. 
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3. Firm's welfare 
Assuming that the fiitures exchange rate is unbiased, the risk averse firm hedging 
in futures markets is better off under uncertainty than under certainty, regardless of the 
optimal level of total output. In other words, its expected utility of the profit with futures 
markets under exchange rate risk, E\U(jV(X^(Q^,e),h*))\, is greater than its 
utility of the profit with certainty (II'O. UC[Y(y''(Q'',e),e)), where h* is the optimal 
number of futures contracts sold, and Q' are the optimal levels of total output in the 
presence of futures markets and under certainty, respectively. The indirect profit functions 
are described as 
U.UY(Q ,^e).e.h*) = R(Y(Q .^e))+eR(Q  ^- Y(Q ,^e)) 
-C(q^)-eC(0^-q^)->r(ej. -e)h* 
W(Y(Q\e),e) = R(Y(Q\e))^eR(Q'-YCQ'JJJ-CCq" )-eC(Q'-q'). 
PROPOSITION 4-2. Assuming an unbiasedfutures market (e^  ^e), the risk averse firm 
hedging in futures markets benefits from uncertainty, even though perfect hedging is not 
feasible. 
PROOF. It can be verified by showing that E[U(XV(Y(Q^ ,e),e,h*))] is greater 
than U(Tr(Y(Q',e),e)). Suppose the risk averse firm chooses Q = Q'' and h = h where 
h = R(Q' -Y(Q',e))-C(Q'-q"), which represent output and net foreign revenue for 
the deterministic case. Then, realized profits in the presence of exchange rate risk are 
UUY(Q\e).e,h) = R(Y(Q\e))^eR(0'-Y(0',e))-C(q')-eC(Q'-q') 
Mey -e)(R(Q' - Y(Q',e))-C(Q'-q'')). 
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Hence, (YCQ'.eJ.eMj-WCYCQ",e).e) 
= [Ra(Q'',e)) + eR(Q' - Y(Q',e))]-[R(Y(Q\e))^eR(Q'' - Y(Q\e))] 
+(ej. -e)CR(Q'-Y(Q'.e))-C(Q'-qV). 
Assuming e^. =e, it implies XV (Y(Q'.e),e,h)>W(Y(Q'',e),e) for all e since 
[R(Y(Q\e))+eR(Q' - Y(Q\e))J>[R(Y(Q'.e)) + eR(Q^ - Y(Q',e))] and 
YCQ'.e) ^ YfQ'.e^ for all e e by the definition of maximization problem, 
fR(Y(Q''.e))+eR(Q''-Y(Q\e))J=max [R(Y) + eR(Q''-Y)]. Therefore, 
r 
Uai^(Y(Q\e).e.h)J > UrWfYrQW.e)) and thus 
E[U(Y[^(Y(Q',e),e,h))] >U(1LV(Y(Q',e),e)). In addition, it is also true that 
E[U(Tl^(Y(Q^ ,e),e,h*))J >E[Uf[V (YCQ" ,e),e,h))] by the definition of maximization 
problem, 
E[U(U.UY(Q^,e),e,h*))]= max E[U(T[(Y(Q.e),e.h))] fo raUe 
q,Q,h 
where Y[(Y(Q,ej.e.h) = R(Y(Q,e))+eR(Q-Y(0,e))-C(q)-eC(Q-q) + (ej. -e)h. 
This proves that E[U(YV (Y(Q^ ,e),e,h*))]>U(YV(Y(Q^ ,e),e)) for all e^e. Q.E.D. 
Therefore, the risk averse firm is always better ofif with risk in the presence of 
unbiased futures markets, regardless of the optimal levels of total output and futures 
contracts sold. 
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C. Optimal futures position 
I turn to the issue of what the optimal futures position is when other hedging 
instruments are not available. Again, it is not possible to perfectly hedge against risk with 
a single hedging instrument when the profit function is nonlinear in the random variable. 
As mentioned earlier, the nonlinearity of the profit fimction may come fi'om multiple 
sources of risk and/or the sequence of decisions. Since the assumption made on the 
sequence of decisions in this model makes the profit function nonlinear in the exchange 
rate, full hedging with futures contracts only is not attained here. 
I assume that futures markets are unbiased (e^ = e ), and e = e + e where f has a 
zero mean with a symmetric distribution (J(e) = f (-e)). In addition, foreign net 
revenue is assumed to be positive so that the first derivative of indirect profit function with 
- -
respect to the exchange rate is positive, —— =  R - C  >0.  Demand curves  a re  assumed de 
to be linear, implying that slopes of marginal revenue functions are constant, R" -R" 0. 
Then, the following proposition can be derived. 
PROPOSITION 4-3. The optimalfutures position depends upon the shape of demand 
curves. With linear demands, the optimal futures position is short and less than the 
foreign net revenue of the determ.inistic case. 
Defining G(Q,e) s [R(Y)+eR(0-Y)], the profit function can be expressed as 
Yl = G(Q,e)-C(q)-eC(q)+h(ej. -e). The indirect revenue function is obtained as 
See Moschini and Lapan (1992, 1995). 
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C ' C S . * ( Q ' ^ ) )  +  Q ~ Y * ( Q , e ) )  after solving the sales decision problem. 
Differentiating it with respect to the exchange rate, one obtains; 
GJQ.eJ=R(Q-r*(Q.e)J, G„iQ,e) = -(R')\R'+eR'r\ and 
G^CQ.e) = SCR'/R'-fR' + eR')-" +(R')'(R' + eR')-'(R-'-eR'')—. 
oe 
Using Taylor series expansion, the indirect revenue function can be expanded around the 
mean of the exchange rate as 
G(Q.e) = G(Q.e) + G,(Q,e)e +^G„(Q.e)s^ +^G^(Q,e(s))s^ where e e [e,e]. 
2 o 
I use this expansion to describe the profit function as 
Y\.(e) = A^(B-h)e^6(e) 
^htvtA^G(Q,e)-C(q)-eC(Q-q),B^G/Q.e)-C(Q-q)=R(Q-Y(Q.e))-C, 
and d{e) =^G„(Q.e)e' +^G„/0.e(e)Je\ 
The first order condition of the hedging decision problem can be rewritten as 
= L[Um(-e))-U'ai(s)W(s)cls = 0,'' 
" =-E[U's] = Lf-U'aiCsJ)M(eJcie +Lo[-Um(e))j6f(£)de 
= tf-Um(-e))J(-sJf(-eJd(-s)+l^-Um(s)WCe)de 
= lyum(-e))MCe)de - LfU'(n(£))M(s)ds 
= L[UmC-£))-Um(e)W(e)de = 0 
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where Y\(+e) = A-ir(B-h)e+d(+e) and T[(-e)= A-(B-h)e •¥d(-e). Evaluating 
this first order condition at A = 5 yields; 
^U(Y[(e)) 
^LofUmC-e)) - UmCe))M(s)de 
's>0 
fefl ch 
where Yl(^e) = A^-9(-^e) and YK-e) = A+6(-e). 
COROLLARY. The optimalfutures position can be described as follows: 
> > f h*—B as G.^ —0. assuming that 
< < 
hedging decision problem holds. 
 , the second order condition of the production and 
PROOF. Given V<0, [U'OK-e))-U'(Y{(e))]^0^s[Ylf-e)-YU^e)J^O. 
Since Yl(-e)-U(+e)=d(-£)-dC+e) = -^fG„/Q.e(+£j) + G„/Q,e(-e))]e^ for 
o 
„ < ^ > ^U(U(e)) 
£>0, fU(-e) - U(+e)J—0 as -0. Thus, 
> '*•< ' 3i 
—0 as G^ —0. Given the 
«» 
h=B ^  
second order condition, it proves h *—B as G,„ —0. Q.E.D. 
Since the sign of depends on the second derivative of the marginal revenue 
functions, the optimal futures position cannot generally be determined without knowing 
the shape of demand curves. For the case of linear demands, /?" = * = 0, we obtam 
G,„ (Q,e) = 3( R' f R'C R' + eR')~- < 0, and hence the optimal amount of fixtures foreign 
currency sold must be less than the foreign net revenue of the deterministic case, h* <B. 
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In order to show that the optimal futures position is short, I evaluate the first order 
condition of the hedging decision problem at h = 0. The profit function at h = 0 becomes 
n = RCY * (Q, eJ)+eR(Q-Y*(Q.e))-C(q)-eC(q). Given the assumption of the 
positive foreign net revenue, the evaluation at h = 0 becomes positive, 
^Uai(s)) 
= EfUmXe^ -e)J = EfUmXe-eJJ >0.^ 
k=0 ch 
Together with the second order conditions, this implies that the optimal amount of futures 
foreign currency sold is greater than zero, h*>0. 
Therefore, the optimal futures position is 0 <h*< R(Q-Y(Q,e))-C with linear 
demands. Since the level of perfect hedging, R(0-Y(O.e)) - C, is a function of the 
random exchange rate, complete hedging cannot be attained via futures contracts alone. 
^ 11 ^ i*ir 
 ^From U' <0 and = R-C >0 at/? = 0. —— = W-^r- <0 at h = 0, and thus 
cov(U',e) <0. Since cov(U',e) = EfU'e]-(E[U'J)(E[e])= EfU'e]-E[U'e] 
= E[U'-(e-e)] <0, E[U'-(e -e)]>0 aih = 0. 
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CHAPTER V. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
In the previous chapters, I have assumed that the firm produces in both markets, 
implying that the firm has plants in both home and foreign countries. However, assuming 
that the firm decides where to open its plant at the beginning of the period, and then 
decides where and how much to produce after the resolution of uncertainty, it may not be 
profitable to open both plants, depending on which plant has lower marginal cost and 
which plant is cheaper to open. In order to examine the firm's investment decision, the 
assumption that the firm operates in both markets is relaxed in this chapter. The firm's 
decision about where to produce depends on the cost structure in each plant. Under 
certainty, assuming constant marginal costs, the firm will choose only one plant to open 
and produce there because it knows which plant is cheaper to open and operate. Under 
uncertainty, however, the exchange rate is unknown at the time the decision of where to 
open is made, and thus the firm does not know which plant will have the lower marginal 
cost ex post. The firm will produce only at the plant with lower marginal cost, even 
though it may open both plants. This result follows because the firm knows which plant 
has lower marginal cost at the time of its production decision. Assuming that the marginal 
cost at both domestic and foreign plants are constant, I investigate how the variability of 
the exchange rate afiects the firm's decision to open a foreign plant. 
In the deterministic case, the firm opens and produces only in the home (foreign) 
plant if c < ^  and F <eF {c>ec and F>eF) where c and c are constant marginal 
costs, e (the mean of the exchange rate) is used for the actual exchange rate with 
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certainty, and F and F are fixed costs for the investment in the home and foreign plants, 
respectively. Therefore, the firm opens and produces only in the home plant if e < e and 
F<eF where e is defined as the value of e at which the marginal costs are equalized, 
e  =  c / c .  
Under uncertainty, however, it is not clear where the firm will wish to open its 
plant(s) because which plant has lower marginal cost depends on the realized exchange 
rate. I assume that fixed costs are incurred at a known exchange rate and, for simplicity, 
F < eF For example, the fixed costs can be licensing, certification, and other fixed fees 
firms incur to open a plant. All fixed costs are incurred before production, while the 
actual production decision is made after the exchange rate is known. Assuming that the 
actual exchange rate varies around its mean fi'om e, to e„ (e, < e < e„), the firm will 
choose to open only the home plant even under uncertainty if e < e, and F <eF since the 
foreign plant always has higher marginal cost in this case.^ However, if e, < e, the firm 
may want to pay the amount ofeF in order to have the flexibility in production that 
would allow it to produce in the foreign plant as well as the domestic plant, because the 
actual exchange rate may fall into the domain of [e/, e ], where the foreign plant is cheaper 
to operate.^ Figure 3 shows this situation. If this is the case, the firm may open both 
plants. Once the firm opens both plants, the firm will produce in the home plant with 
l o w e r  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  c  w h e n  e > e ,  a n d  p r o d u c e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  p l a n t  w i t h  e c  w h e n  e < e .  
e is used for the actual exchange rate with ceitainty at the time fLxed costs are incurred. 
 ^If e < e,, then it is always true that e <e ox c <ec. 
 ^Foreign plant has lower marginal cost in the domain of [e,, e ], while home plant has lower marginal 
cost in the domain of [e ]. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between marginal costs and exchange rate 
The decision of how many plants to open thus depends on the net benefit fi^om opening 
both plants. The firm will not open the foreign plant if the cost to open the foreign plant is 
greater than the expected benefit fi-om the option of producing abroad. Thus, I study the 
firm's decision of opening its plants by examining the expected option-value {E[VJ), 
where Fis the difference between the profits with both plants open (11'') and with only the 
home plant open (!!''). 
This issue will be analyzed for the case of c < ec (or e < e) and F  < e F ,  assuming 
e, < e For convenience of the analysis, I first examine this issue when total output is 
held fixed, and then extend it to the case of price responsive total output. Finally, I 
investigate how exchange rate uncertainty affects the firm's investment behavior when it 
faces a competitor in the foreign market, and also analyze how its investment decision 
aflfects the foreign firm's welfare. 
The case o f o e c  and F  >  e F  follows the same analysis. 
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A. Fixed total output 
In this section, I study the firm's decision of opening its plants when total output is 
fixed, regardless of the level of price. I consider a firm that has contracts with distributors 
or wholesalers to supply a certain amount of the product for a certain period of time. The 
supply (output) of this firm does not vary with price during the period because the level of 
total output of the firm is predetermined. In this case, the firm decides where to open its 
plant under uncertainty, and decides where to produce under certainty. Since total output 
is assumed to be fixed, there is no decision about how much to produce. The firm's 
investment decision may vary with its attitude toward risk, and thus I investigate this issue 
for risk neutrality and for risk aversion separately. 
1. Risk neutrality 
If the risk neutral firm decides to use its option to open the foreign plant, it will 
pay the cost of opening the foreign plant and will have the flexibility in production to 
produce at the plant with lower marginal cost. Alternatively, the firm may open only the 
h o m e  p l a n t  a n d  p r o d u c e  t h e r e  w i t h  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  c < ^  ( o r  e  < e )  a n d  F  < e F  
Assuming that the firm sells only at home, the profits with both plants open (H^) and with 
only the home plant open (IT'') can be described as 
Y l "  = P Q -  m i n [  c , e c  J Q - F - e F ,  
W ^ P Q - c Q - F .  
" While feasible, it will never be optimal to open only the foreign plant i f  c < e c  and F  < e F ,  o r  i f  
c < e c  a n d  F  < e F .  
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long put 
Figure 4. The value of opening the foreign plant 
The cost of tF can be considered as the cost incurred to get flexibility in production. 
The value of the option (F) providing a chance to produce at the plant with lower 
marginal cost can be expressed as the difference of FI'' from n*, 
— eF 
y= n'' - n* =cQ-mm[c,ecJQ-eF =(max[ 0.e-eJ-—)cQ.^  
This value is represented graphically by "long put" in Figure 4.^' Figure 4 graphically 
shows that the value of opening the foreign plant is the difference between and 11'' -
The expected option-value can be written as 
ECV) = EOl'-W ) = E(max[0,e~e]-^)cO. (5-1) 
cQ 
This expression is the same as the expected net benefit from a long position of put options 
V=(c-min[c,ec])Q-eF =(^-min[^.e]) c Q-eF =(e -min[e,ej) cQ-eF 
I call it "long put" because it has the same form as the value of put options purchased, not because it is 
the value of put options purchased. 
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eF . 
where e can be considered as the strike price, —r as the price of the put option, and c Q 
cQ 
as the number of put options purchased. Thus, the value of providing a chance to produce 
at the plant with lower marginal cost has the same form as that of buying a put option on 
the exchange rate. Therefore, producing at the foreign plant provides the same effects as 
exercising a put option. The risk neutral firm wants to use the option to open the foreign 
eF 
plant if the expected option-value is positive, E(V)>0 or E(max[O.e-e J) > . The 
option to open both plants diflFers fi"om a put option in the sense that the purpose of taking 
the option to open both plants is to take advantage fi-om having a chance to produce at the 
plant with lower marginal cost, while agents may buy a put option to avoid a risk fi-om an 
uncertain variable. The expected value of opening the foreign plant increases when the 
exchange rate is more volatile. It can be shown with a mean-preserving spread of the 
distribution of the exchange rate. 
If a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the exchange rate is employed, 
the variability of the exchange rate becomes riskier, and this leads to a higher expected 
option-value. Therefore, the probability that the firm takes the option to open the foreign 
plant gets higher when the exchange rate is more volatile. It can be analytically shown as 
follows. With the mean-preserving spread of the distribution, e is replaced by 
x + yCx-x) where ^^is the mean-preserving spread parameter, and x = e}^ Using the 
integral expression, the expected option-value in equation (5-1) can be expressed as 
^  e  =  E [ e ] = E [ x  +  Y ( x - x ) ]  =  x ,  a n d  v a r ( e )  =  E [ ( x - \ - Y ( x - x ) ) - x ] ^ - y ^ E [ x - x ] ^  
= var(x). 
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E(V) = E(U'-Yl") =cQl(e-e)g(e)de-eF.'' 
For the mean-preserving spread, it turns out to be 
E(V) = cQj^[x+rCx-x)-Cx+y(x-x))Jg(x)dx - eF 
= cQl^r(x-x)g(x)dx-eF(5-2) 
The derivative of the expected option-value with respect to ^can be derived from 
equation (5-2), 
=cQ\'^ (x - x)g(x)dx. 
By signing it, we can see how the expected option-value varies with the mean-preserving 
spread parameter. This derivative is positive because x is greater than x over the domain 
integrated. Therefore, the value of retaining the flexibility in production increases when 
the variability of the exchange rate gets larger, and the firm is more likely to open both 
plants when the exchange rate is quite volatile. 
2. Risk aversion 
As described in the previous section, the profit with both plants open (11^) can be 
expressed as the profit with only the home plant open (H*) plus the term which has the 
same form as the value of put options purchased (W), 
^ E(V) = E(cQ-mm[c,ec]Q- eF) =qIO(c- ec)g(e)de + gf (c - c)g(e)de - eF 
= cQIoC^ -e)g(e)de-eF = cQfje -ejg(e)de- eF 
c 
^Sincee = x + e  =  x  +  y ( x - x ) .  
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where W=(max[0,e-e] —^)c Q. The risk averse firm opens both plants if 
cQ 
EfU(Tl'')J> UdV'), while the risk neutral firm uses the option to open both plants if 
£/nV> n*. Note that E[Tl''J> n* does not mvply EfUfYV' )J> UfTV) for the risk 
averse firm. It is true for the risk averse firm that E[U(YV )]< U(E[Yl'' ]) by Jensen's 
inequality where U' <0 and U(E[Y]^ ])> U(Y\'') for the case of£7TlV> H*. Putting 
them together provides E[U(Y['')]^U(U!'). Since, in this model, revenue is not 
subjected to exchange rate risk, the risk averse firm is less likely to open the foreign plant, 
even if EIT^]> IT''. On the other hand, when the risk neutral firm is indifferent in 
opening the foreign plant, E[Y]!']= n*, the risk averse firm will not want to open the 
foreign plant because £/Z7(n''y^/< UfEfTl*' ]) = U(Y['') by Jensen's inequality. 
Therefore, regardless of the expected benefit of the risk neutral firm fi-om opening 
the foreign plant, doing so exposes it to potential exchange rate risk. To avoid this risk, 
eF 
the firm may want to sell put options. Suppose E(max[0,e-ej)> 3— so that the risk 
cQ 
neutral firm chooses to open the foreign plant, Efll''J > n''. If the risk averse firm sells 
put options with the strike price of e, that are fairly priced at price IT'' with put 
options sold (U^) becomes 
eF n''=n''+(max[0,e-e]-—^)cO+(r-max[0,e~e])z 
cQ 
Fairly priced put options mean here that the expected value of a put option is equal to zero, 
r = E(max[0,e-e]). 
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short put 
Figure 5. Role of short put options in the investment decision 
The risk averse finn sells put options of c ^  at price r, and 
chooses to open the foreign plant if the risk neutral firm is 
better offby opening the foreign plant 
where z is the number of put options sold. If the risk averse firm sells put options equal to 
the foreign exchange cost incurred when it produces abroad, i.e., z = cQ, then n' has no 
risk, n' cQ, and hence E[U(U')J = U(E/Tl''J)=U(n')• Thus, 
eg 
n '>  n*  and  Udl'') >U(Tl''). As shown in Figure 5, exchange rate risk is offset by 
short put options, since these options eliminate all the risk occurred from the variability of 
the exchange rate. The assumptions that put options are fairly priced implies that put 
options do not affect expected profits and thus, with optimal risk hedging, risk attitudes 
do not matter. Therefore, when the risk neutral firm is better off by opening the foreign 
plant, the risk averse firm will also choose to open the foreign plant by selling put options 
that are fairly priced. 
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B. Price responsive total output 
I have examined the firm's decision of opening its plants with total output fixed in 
the previous section. As mentioned in the previous section, this model may make sense 
for firms that have contracts with distributors or wholesalers for a certain period of time 
so that the firm's supply is not varied with price during that period. For many industries, 
however, the firm's production decision is likely to be affected by the price of the product. 
Returning to our assumption of a profit maximizing monopolist, I study the firm's decision 
of opening its plants when total output varies with price, and compare the results to those 
in the previous section. 
As assumed earlier in this chapter, the exchange rate is known before the 
production decision is made, but it is unknown at the time of the decision of where to 
open plants. Remember that I assumed c<Tc and F <eF so that the firm produces at 
home in the deterministic case. For simplicity of the analysis, I keep the assumption that 
the firm sells only at home. With price responsive total output, the profit fiinctions 
become 
X^(e)=max [R(Q)-min[e,e]cQ-F-ef ], 
Q 
W=max [R(Q)-cQ-FJ. 
Q 
When the firm opens the domestic plant only, the risk neutral firm chooses the optimal 
level of output by maximizing its profit with certainty, FI*. The first order condition of 
this problem can be written as 
RrQ)-c = 0. 
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Note that, for this case, the optimal level of total output is independent of the exchange 
rate, and hence the firm is not exposed to exchange rate risk. This parallels the model of 
the previous section where total output was fixed. 
On the other hand, when the firm opens both plants, the firm maximizes its profit, 
n', by choosing the optimal level of output based upon the realized value of e. The first 
order condition of this problem can be written as 
R'(Q)-c = 0 \£e <e (ox c<ec), 
R'(Q)-ec = 0 i£e>e (oroecj. 
The optimal levels of total output and profit vary with the exchange rate when the firm 
chooses to open both plants, while they are independent of the exchange rate when the 
firm opens only the home plant. The optimal levels of total output for both cases are 
determined by the same rule and so are the same when the home plant is used (i.e., when 
e  < e ) .  However, the optimal level of total output for the case when the foreign plant is 
used (i.e., when e > e )  depends on the exchange rate because it is a function of ec, 
0'' =Q''(ec J. The slope of the line representing the relationship between the optimal 
level of total output and the exchange rate is derived by totally differentiating the first 
order condition of the production decision problem, 
30'' cQ'' . 3D'' c 
= 0  i f  e  <e ,  and  ~ r~  =  T"  < 0  i f e > e  
dz d& dz R' 
where Q'' and Q'' are the optimal outputs when the firm opens both plants and when it 
opens only the home plant, respectively. 
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Figure 6. Relationships of outputs and profits with exchange rate^^ 
The optimal level of total output is negatively related to the exchange rate when e > e .  
This relationship is shown in (a) of Figure 6. The optimal profit is obtained by using the 
optimal level of total output, 
n Y c ;  = V c ; ;  -  C0 V c ;  -  F ,  
n''(cJ = RCQ''(cJJ-cQ''(c)-F-eF if e<e, 
U ! " ( e c )  =  R ( Q ' ' ( e c ) ) - e c O ' ' ( e c ) - F - e F  i f e > e  
where 0''('cJ = 0''CcJ. Notethat n''('cj = n''J-eF and n''CecJ>11''("cJ-eF. The 
optimal profit is also negatively related to the exchange rate with the slope of -cQ'' (ec) 
when e>e. This slope is not constant because O'' is a function of the exchange rate when 
e>e, while the slope of the profit function with fixed total output (ec))'mthe 
is profit with fixed total output when the firm opens both plants, P Q ~ s c Q — F ~ e F  if 
e>e, and 11''^ = PQ — cQ — F—eF ife<e. And FT'' is profit with price responsive total output 
when the firm opens both plants. 11'' is not less than Fl'^ , IT'' ^  11''^ , because IT'' is maximized with 
respect to Q, while is not and is just a function of predetermined total output. 
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domain of e >e is -cQ, which is constant. The relationships between the optimal profits 
and the exchange rate are shown in (b) of Figure 6. As shown there, the indirect profit 
function with price responsive total output is nonlinear in the exchange rate. The expected 
value of opening the foreign plant {£[¥]= E[Y]!'-Xl'' ]) can now be written as 
E[VJ = E[RCQ'(ec))-ecQ^(ec)-(R(Q''(c))-cQ'(c))-eF]+E [-eFj f>€ «<* 
= -eF+E[R(ff(ec))-ecQ!'(ec)-(R(Q'(c»-(^(c))l 
€>€ 
where V= -eF ife<e, 
V= RfQ" (ec)) - ecQ^ (ec) -(RCQ" (c)) - cQ" (c))-eF ife>e. 
The expression of /TI'' -11*7 is different fi-om that in the case of fixed total output only 
when e > e; in particular, the ability to adjust output increases the (expected) value of 
opening the foreign plant.^^ The decision to open the foreign plant for the risk neutral firm 
depends on the sign of the expected option-value. If E[V7 > 0, the risk neutral firm will 
have higher expected profit with both plants, and will therefore choose to open the foreign 
plant. Note, however, that for the risk averse firm, a put option will not provide a perfect 
hedge because profits are strictly convex (nonlinear) in e for e > e due to the 
responsiveness of total output to the exchange rate. 
It is possible to illustrate the expected option-value more clearly by employing a 
linear demand. Using the linear demand, P(Q) = a-bQ,\h& revenue Sanction and the 
marginal revenue function are expressed as R(Q) = aQ-bQ^ and R'(Q)-a-2bQ. The 
" The value of opening the foreign plant with fixed total output \sV=-eF e <e, and 
V= -ecQ+cQ -eF if e>e. It is linear in the exchange rate. 
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first order condition of the production decision problem for the case of opening only the 
home plant then is 
a-2bQ-c = 0. 
From this equation, the optimal level of production can be calculated, Q = , and 
^\2  
thus the optimal profit, 11* = r F- Note that th^ are independent of the 
4b 
exchange rate. 
On the other hand, when the firm uses its option to open the foreign plant, the first 
order condition of the production decision problem becomes 
a-2bQ-c = 0 ife<e, 
a-2bQ-ec =0 if e>e. 
The optimal levels of output and profit are thus 
a—c . (a — cf — 
0*=——andn =—— F-eF '\fe<e, 
2D  4b 
2b 4b 
Then, the expected option-value, E[V] =£/!!'' - FlV. can be calculated as 
^ Ja-ec)'-(a-c)' 
F[V] =E[ — eF] + E [-eF ] 
e>€ 40 €<e 
= -eF+jg-^[2ac(l-j)-c'(l-(Tf)Jg(e)de (5-3) 
4b e e 
e 
where j < / in the domain integrated. Therefore, the risk neutral firm takes the option to 
open the foreign plant as well as the domestic plant if E[V ]>0. 
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Table 2. The expected values of opening the foreign plant 
{a.p} (8, 12} (7, 13} (6, 14} (5, 15} 
Em -13.37 -3.4 1J\ 19.53 
In order to see how this expected value changes with the variability of the 
exchange rate, I perform a simple simulation. The values of the parameters used in this 
simulation are given by; {e, a, b, c, c, F, F}={10, 60, 1, 20, 2.2, 20, 2}. These specific 
values satisfy the assumptions made on this analysis, c<ec (or e<e) and F<eF. 
Using an uniform distribution of the exchange rate," four different variabilities of the 
exchange rate are examined, {a,p}={%, 12}, {7, 13}, {6, 14}, {5, 15}. Substituting 
these particular values into equation (5-3), we obtain the numerical values for the 
expected value of opening the foreign plant for each variability. These values are shown in 
Table 2. This table tells us that the expected value of opening the foreign plant increases 
with larger variability of the exchange rate. When {a,P} ={8, 12} or {7, 13}, the firm is 
likely to open only the home plant because the variability is not large enough to induce the 
firm to open the foreign plant. The firm, however, has more chance to get positive benefit 
fi-om opening the foreign plant if the variability gets larger, for example, {a,p }={6, 14} 
or {5, 15}. This is consistent with the result fi-om the simulation performed in the next 
section.^' The difference between the cell (ii) and (iv) in all tables of Table 3 provides the 
 ^The uniform distribution of e can be written asg(e) = ——— for a <e< and 0  elsewhere. 
P or 
The numerical values for costs are slightly different in the two simulations. In this simulation, the 
values given to the costs satisfy c < ^ and F = eF, while the values in the simulation of the next 
section satisfy c = ec and F <eF. Since both cases implies that the firm produces at home in the 
deterministic case, the qualitative results for both cases are the same. 
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expected option-value, E[V], when there is no competitor. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the firm is more likely to open the foreign plant with larger variability of the exchange 
rate. 
C. Strategic advantage 
Under the assumption that the multinational firm (MNF) does not sell, or fece any 
competitor in the foreign market, I have examined how its foreign direct investment 
decision is affected by the variability of the exchange rate. In order to study a more 
realistic case, I relax this assumption and assume that the MNF sells and faces a 
competitor in the foreign market. I will now investigate the case where the MNF sells in 
both domestic and foreign markets, while the local (foreign) firm sells only in its own 
market. Assuming that both firms are risk neutral, the MNF may or may not open the 
foreign plant, depending upon its expected profits, and produces at the plant with lower 
marginal cost, but the local firm produces only in its own country. I keep the same 
assumption on the sequence of decisions; both firms' sales and production decisions are 
made after the resolution of the exchange rate uncertainty, but their investment decisions 
are made under uncertainty. I also assume that both firms move at the same time so that 
they play a Coumot-Nash game; that is, neither firm makes its decisions before or after its 
competitor makes decisions. In this simultaneous move game, even if the local firm 
produces and sells in the foreign market only, the optimal output and profit of the local 
firm are indirectly affected by exchange rate uncertainty through the optimal output of the 
MNF. Thus, the MNF may gain a strategic advantage by having a chance to open the 
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foreign plant. If uncertainty encourages the MNF to open the foreign plant, it may hurt 
the local firm, which has no such opportunity. 
Assuming that all marginal costs are constant, the profit functions of the MNF can 
be described as 
n* =(P(Y)-c)Y+(eP(Y + Y)-c)Y-F, 
n* = P(Y)Y+eP(Y+Y)Y-min[c,ec](Y+Y)-F-eF 
where P(Y) is the inverse demand of the domestic market, P(Y+Y)isih& inverse 
demand of the foreign market, and Y is the level of sales of the local firm. Similarly, the 
profit fiinction of the local firm can be written as 
U! =-P(Y + Y)Y-dY-G 
where d is the constant marginal cost of the local firm, and G is the fixed cost of the 
local firm. As in the previous section, I keep the assumption that the MNF opens and 
produces only at the domestic plant in the deterministic case, i.e., c<Wc and F <eF 
Under uncertainty, the MNF may choose to open only the home plant or may open both 
plants, depending upon the variability of the exchange rate. The firms choose the level of 
sales to maximize their profits after the exchange rate is known. If the MNF opens only 
the home plant, assuming that all the sales are positive, the optimal conditions of each firm 
can be expressed as 
 ^In the deteiministic case, the MNF is allowed to open both plants, but has no advantage in doing so if 
c<ec. Opening the foreign plant conveys no strategic advantage, per se, and thus opening only the 
home plant is always a dominant strategy. 
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^n' 
dl 
= P(Y)+P'(Y)Y-c = 0, (5-4) 
^^ = eP(Y + Y) + eP'Y-c = 0, (5-5) 
Ol 
^^-=P(Y ^ Y)^P'Y-d = 0 (5-6) 
where the superscript h denotes the MNF and the superscript Ih denotes the local firm 
when the MNF opens only the home plant. By solving these equations, we obtain the 
optimal solutions for sales, Y'', V'feJ, and Y*'(e). Note that the optimal domestic sales 
of the MNF is independent of the exchange rate, while exchange rate uncertainty affects 
the optimal sales of the local firm as well as the optimal foreign sales of the MNF. 
On the other hand, if the MNF opens both plants, the optimal conditions for the 
MNF will be 
dY 
= P(Y) + P'(Y)Y-c = 0, (5-7) 
^^ = eP(Y + Y)+eP'Y-c = 0 (5-8) 
where c s minf c,ec ] and the optimal condition of the local firm is the same as equation 
(5-6). Note that if c < ec, the conditions for the MNF are the same as those when the 
MNF opens only the home plant because c = c if c < ec (or e < e), and thus the optimal 
sales are the same in both cases. However, if c> ec, then c = ec and the optimal sales in 
the home market (Y'') depend on the exchange rate, while all sales in the foreign market 
— ,  A .  (y , Y ) are independent of the random exchange rate. 
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We can have some idea about the shape of the optimal sales in the exchange rate 
from total differentiation of the optimal conditions. For the case when the MNF opens 
only the home plant, by totally differentiating equations (5-5) and (5-6), we can obtain 
R'R' 
^ efR'R'-(R'-P'XR'-P')]' 
gf* _ R'-(R'-P') 
de ~~e[(R'-P')(R'-P')-R'R'J 
where R(Y)=P(Y)Y, R(Y+ Y)=P(Y+ Y)Y, and R(Y-^Y) = P(Y+ Y)Y, whereas 
dY  ^
—— = 0. It is assumed that all the revenue functions have positive and decreasing 
oe 
marginal revenues, R', R', R'>0 and R', R', R' <0. Since \R'\ > |i?'- /"I and 
of 
> i?' - PI, and P', R', R' < 0, the denominator in —— is positive, and thus is 
^ OS 
dY*' I I , positive. In a smiilar manner, the sign of is negative as long as \R'\ > [Pi.  Therefore,  
the optimal foreign sales of the MNF when it opens only the home plant is an increasing 
function in the exchange rate, and the optimal sales of the local firm in the same case is a 
decreasing function in the exchange rate. On the other hand, when the MNF opens both 
plants, how Y'', Y'', and Y'' respond to the variability of the exchange rate depends on the 
domain. If oec, the MNF produces at the foreign subsidiary, and thus Y'' and 7' are 
independent of the exchange rate, whereas Y'' depends on the exchange rate. From 
equation (5-7), we obtain 
ffY*" c  ^ d^Y" (^SP'+P'Y")^ " 
and thus —^ 
de 2P' + P''Y'' Ss' (IP'+P'Y"/ ^ ' 
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Since the denominator of is equal to the slope of the domestic marginal revenue of 
OS 
the MNF, /?' (assumed to be negative), the sign of is negative. Therefore, i f o e c ,  OS 
the optimal domestic sales of the MNF when it opens both plants is a decreasing function 
in the exchange rate where its shape depends on the shape of the domestic demand curve. 
However, if c < ec, production takes in the home plant of the MNF and the impact of the 
exchange rate variability on production is the same as in the case when the MNF open 
only the home plant. 
These relationships provide the implication for the production and sales behavior 
of the firms. The MNF sells more at home and abroad when it opens both plants than 
when it opens only the home plant if c> ec, while it sells the same amounts at home and 
abroad for both cases if c < ec. This implies that the MNF is expected to produce and sell 
more when it opens both plants. However, the local firm is expected to produce and sell 
less when the MNF opens both plants because /  <Y*' if  c> ec and K' '  = if  c  < ec.  
We can see in Figure 7 how the optimal levels of sales of both firms for each case are 
related to the exchange rate where the curvature of the optimal sales are determined using 
linear demands as shown below. 
76 
r 
k 
1* 
r 
A 
-•e yi 
-> e -*-e 
Figure 7. Relationships between the optimal sales and the exchange rate 
Using linear demands with the slopes of-/,P = a-F dXid P =a-(Y + yj, the 
optimal sales and the indirect profits when the MNF opens only the home plant are 
obtained as 
a — c —. ¥ '= — ¥ " ( 6 ) ^  
— c — c 
a + d - 2 —  a - 2 d + -
Y''(e) = 
_ (a+d-2^)' 
h _ir—^ J-JU. ^  
(a —2d + 
G. 
We can see their shapes by examining the first and the second derivatives with respect to 
the exchange rate; 
af" 2c d'Y" 4c m 2c 
d e ~  d a '  "  ~  3 e '  
h  ( a + d + 2 ~ ) ( a + d - 2 ^ )  
de 
e- .  Sc' ^ 
—  > 0 ,  — =  — r > 0 .  
' de' 9e J ^ 
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agqiming positive values of sales. Therefore, when it opens only the home plant, the 
optimal foreign sales of the MNF are increasing and concave in the exchange rate, and the 
optimal sales of the local firm are decreasing and convex, while the optimal domestic sales 
of the MNF are independent of the exchange rate. The profits of the MNF are increasing 
and convex in the exchange rate, and the profits of the local firm are decreasing and 
convex. 
On the other hand, the optimal sales and the indirect profits when the MNF opens 
both plants are,  if  c>ec; 
1  v »  v '  a - 2 d + c  
. r - — 5  . y -  ^  .  
(a-ecf (a+d-2c)^ - - (a-2d + cf _ 
n = +e r  - F - e F , Y l  = -G. 4 y y 
The first and second derivatives of the optimal sales and the indirect profit of the MNF 
with respect to the exchange rate for the case of oec can be shown to be 
c 
de ~~ 2^^' de' 
c(a~ec) (a +d -2c f 
^  2  ^  9  '  2 ^ ^ '  
In the case when it opens both plants, if c> ec, the optimal domestic sales of the MNF are 
decreasing and linear in the exchange rate, while the optimal sales of both firms in the 
foreign market are independent of the exchange rate. The profits of the MNF are a 
quadratic and convex function, and the profits of the local firm are independent of the 
random exchange rate. However, for the case oic<ec, the optimal sales and the profit 
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Figure 8. Relationship between the profits and the exchange rate^^ 
of the local firm will be the same as those when the MNF opens only the home plant, and 
the profit of the MNF will be 11'' = IT* -eF. 
We can see this more clearly in Figure 8. In the case of c> ec, the profit of the 
local firm is less when the MNF opens both plants than when the MNF opens only the 
home plant, while they are the same if c < ec. This implies that the local firm is more 
likely to have lower profits when the MNF opens both plants because the expected profit 
of the local firm when the MNF opens both plants must be less than that when the MNF 
opens only the home plant. For the MNF, it is not clear in Figure 8 whether the expected 
profit of the MNF when it opens both plants is greater than that when it opens only the 
home plant. I will address this issue more in the simulation performed later in this section. 
At e , n'* is not necessarily differentiable because the marginal cost switches at that point, and thus it 
may be kinked at e . Using linear demands, the slope of 11'' at e can be written as follows; 
an' 
ds 
an' 
c(a-c) (a+d-2cf 
& 
2 
a [ U - e F ]  
dz 
9 
if e < e, and 
(a+d •¥2c)(a->rd-2c) 
i f e > e .  
The slopes at e when e <e and when e > e are not necessarily the same. Also, the value of e that 
minimizes FI'' is not necessarily less than e. It can be greater, equal to, or less than e . 
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Given linear demands, the following propositions describe how the variability of the 
exchange rate and the foreign direct investment decision of the MNF afifect the firms' 
welfere. 
PROPOSITION 5-1. Given linear demands, if the MNF opens only the home plant, both 
firms will benefit fi'om exchange rate uncertainty. 
Since the profits of both firms when the MNF opens only the home plant are convex in the 
^2 j-jA ^2 
random exchange rate, , , > 0 and —> 0, we obtain E[X^(e)] > and 
^ oe 
E[X^(e)] > Yl'' '(e), respectively, by Jensen's inequality. This implies that uncertainty 
makes both firms better off as long as the MNF does not open the foreign plant. 
PROPOSITION 5-2. (i) Under uncertainty, opening the foreign plant by the MNF 
lowers the expected profit of the local firm. Furthermore,(ii) opening the foreign plant 
by the MNF makes the local firm worse off as the variability of the exchange rate 
increases. 
PROOF. (i) It can be proved by showing that the expected profit of the local firm 
when the MNF opens the foreign plant is lower than that when the MNF opens only the 
home plant, 
E f U " - 1 1 " ] + =  £ [ ( ¥ " ) ' - ( Y "  ) ' ]  <  0  
*<€ e>4 €>€ 
since Y'' <¥'' if e>e. Therefore, under uncertainty, the local firm's expected profits are 
lower if the MNF opens the foreign plant. Note that under certainty, the MNF's decision 
t o  o p e n  t h e  f o r e i g n  p l a n t  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  l o c a l  f i r m ' s  p r o f i t ,  i . e . ,  ( e ) -  n " * ( e )  =  0 .  
80 
Oi) By employing a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the exchange 
rate, it can be shown that the difference between the expected profits of the local firm 
when the MNF opens both plants and when the MNF opens only the home plant gets 
smaller Oarger in absolute value because it is negative) as the variability of the exchange 
rate increases (i.e., as the mean-preserving spread parameter ^'increases). As done in the 
previous section, for the mean-preserving spread of the distribution, e is replaced by 
X-\-Y(X-X). The difference between the expected profits can be written as 
The first derivative of this difference with respect to the mean-preserving spread 
parameter is described as 
9 c c e 
- g ^ 
f]g(x)dx. 
dr 
')]g(x)dx 
2c^ a ^a—2d+c yfx-x) x ( x - x )  
•)]g(x)dx. 
This expression is negative because f' = 
a - 2d + c . 
~3 is assumed to be positive, x - x > 0  
over the domain integrated, and x  +  y ( x - x j > 0 .  Q.E.D. 
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Therefore, the more volatile is the exchange rate, the more the local firm is hurt 
when the MNF opens the foreign plant. For a clearer analysis, I perform a simulation with 
linear demands in the model by examining several different variabilities of the exchange 
rate. Four cases for each situation are examined; (i) the MNF opens both plants and the 
local firm opens its plant, (ii) the MNF opens both plants and the local firm does not open, 
(iii) the MNF opens only the home plant and the local firm opens its plant, and (iv) the 
MNF opens only the home plant and the local firm does not open. I assume c-ec and 
F < eF so that the MNF opens only the home plant in the deterministic case. Using linear 
demands, the indirect profit Sanctions for each case can be described as follows. 
Deterministic case: 
•¥e 
(a +d -2r/ 
e 
_  ( a - 2 d + ^ y  _ 
-F-eFand IT'= ^ ^ -G 
9 
( a  + d - 2 ^ f  
e 
(a-2d 
-Fandn'= ^ G 
9 
(iv)n M!/F 
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Uncertainty case: 
(i, nw , .p-eF and U'-U. if c>.f 
4 9 9 
n«vF _ u[Mnf (iii)-eF], and 11' is the same as in case Ciii), if c < ec 
(ii) Y[Mnf andn' = 0,ifc>ec 4 4 
n*"^ = /n*^ in case (iii)-eF7, and 11' is the same as in case (iv), ifc<cc 
ra-c)' (S+3-2'-)' (a-2d + ^-)' _ 
(iii) , +e F and U' = 
4 9 V 
( a - c f  (iv)n'^= ,  +g ;^-Fandn'=0 
The values of the parameters used in this simulation are given by; { e ,  a ,  c ,  c ,  F ,  
F,a,d ,G }={10, 60, 20, 2, 20, 2.2, 6, 2, 1.7}. Using an uniform distribution for the 
exchange rate,^® I have examined three different variabilities of the exchange rate, 
{a,fi}={9, 11}, (8, 12}, {7.9, 12.1}. Using these particular numbers, I obtain the 
values of the profits for the deterministic case and the expected profits for the uncertainty 
case as in Table 3. This table provides specific examples for the implications of 
propositions (5-1) and (5-2). From the cell (iii) in all tables, we can see that both firms 
benefit fi-om risk, and the benefits get larger as the variability of the exchange rate 
increases. However, the variability of the exchange rate in table (b) is not large enough to 
 ^See footnote 34. 
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Table 3. Payoffs for different variabilities of the exchange rate 
(a)Detenmnistic case 
Local firm 
MNF 
Open Not open 
Open both (i) (375.78,0.078) (ii) (398,0) 
Open home (in) (397.78,0.078) (iv) (420,0) 
(b)When^a.>9;={9, 11}. 
Local firm 
MNF 
Open Not open 
Open both (i) (379.30,0.037) (ii) (409.19,0) 
Open home (in) (397.83,0.085) (iv) (420.03,0) 
(c)When^a,^>={8, 12}, 
Local firm 
MNF 
Open Not open 
Open both (i) (398.32,0.001) (u) (420.73,0) 
Open home (iii) (398.02,0.108) (iv) (420.14,0) 
(d)Whenfa,>9;={7.9, 12.1}, 
Local firm 
MNF 
Open Not open 
Open both (i) (399.50, -0.002) (u) (421.91,0) 
Open home (iii) (398.05,0.111) (iv) (420.15,0) 
make the MNF better off by opening the foreign plant (compare the cell (i) and (iii) in 
table (b)), even though risk makes the choice of opening the foreign plant more 
worthwhile than under certainty (compare the cell (i) in tables (a) and (b)). The dominant 
strategies in the deterministic case and under uncertainty with the small variability as in 
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table (b) are "Open home" for the MNF and "Open" for the local firm. Therefore, in these 
cases, the Nash equiUbrium is that the MNF opens only the home plant and the local firm 
opens its plant, i.e., the cell (iii) in both tables (a) and (b). However, when the variability 
gets larger up to the level in table (c), the expected profits of the MNF are higher by 
opening the foreign plant than by opening only the home plant. Thus, the MNF has more 
incentive to open the foreign plant, reducing the expected profits of the local firm. As 
shown in the cell CO of table (c), the expected profits of the local firm are close to zero 
with this variability. In spite of that, the dominant strategy of the local firm is still "Open". 
Note, however, that when the exchange rate variability gets larger (for example, the 
variability changes fi-om table (b) to table (c)), the dominant strategy of the MNF changes 
firom "Open home" to "Open both". Therefore, the Nash equilibrium in table (c) is that 
the MNF opens the foreign plant and the local firm opens its plant. From tables (c) and 
(d), we can see that a tiny change in the variability makes the expected profits of the local 
firm negative if the MNF opens both plants, implying that the local firm may drop out 
fi-om the industry. In this case (table (d)), given that opening the foreign plant is the 
dominant strategy of the MNF, the best strategy of the local firm is "Not open". Thus the 
Nash equilibrium in table (d) is that the MNF opens the foreign plant and the local firm 
does not open. Furthermore, by comparing the cell (i) and (iii) in all tables, we can see 
that the larger variability of the exchange rate raises the expected value of opening the 
foreign plant by the MNF, E[X^ (e)-X]!'(e)], and raises the expected loss of the local 
firm when the MNF opens its foreign plant, E[Y{'^ (e)- n"* (e)]. Therefore, the larger 
variability may induce the MNF to open the foreign plant, and so makes the local firm 
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Figure 9. Relationships between the expected profits and 
the variability of the exchange rate^' 
worse oflf. Particularly, the cell (i) and (iii) of tables (a) and (b) shows that 
/Tl® (e)-Y["'(e)] \s zero in the deterministic case, and (e)-Y["'(e)] is negative 
under uncertainty, implying that opening the foreign plant by the MNF hurts the local firm 
even with a small variability of the exchange rate. 
These situations are summarized in Figure 9. In domain I, both firms get benefits 
fi-om risk. Their expected profits increase as the variability gets larger. However, if the 
variability is large enough to induce the MNF to open the foreign plant, the expected 
profits of the local firm decrease discontinuously due to the opening of the foreign plant 
by the MNF. Furthermore, as shown in domain 11, an increase in the variability of the 
exchange rate decreases the expected profits of the local firm. Eventually its expected 
profits may become negative, as shown in domain III; the withdrawal of the local firm 
£ represents the variability of the exchange rate. e = e + s. 
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increases the MNF's profits discontinuously. Therefore, providing the MNF a chance to 
open the foreign plant as well as the domestic plant gives the MNF a potential strategic 
advantage in competition with the local firm, and the variability of the exchange rate 
induces the MNF to exercise this advantage. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I analyzed the production, hedging, and investment behavior of a MNF under 
exchange rate uncertainty. The volatility of the exchange rate affects the firm's behavior 
in various ways, depending upon the situation in which the firm engages. The timing of 
decisions and the firm's attitude toward risk can be crucial components to determine the 
dkection of this effect. I found that a risk averse firm produces less at home and more 
abroad under exchange rate uncertainty in the absence of hedging instruments for the 
nonlinear profit model, holding the level of total production unchanged. This result is the 
same as for the linear profit model (Broil and Zilcha (1992)). The effects of exchange rate 
uncertainty on total output of the risk neutral firm depends upon the shape of marginal 
revenue curves. Uncertainty leads to lower total output with linear demands, but higher 
with constant elasticity demands. Even though the firm produces more or less dependmg 
upon the curvature of demands, the risk neutral firm is always better off under risk. The 
effects on production were also examined when transportation costs exist. It is shown 
that uncertainty makes the risk neutral firm produce more at home, and discourages the 
firm fi-om trading in the presence of transportation costs. 
The study was extended to the case when foreign exchange futures markets are 
available. The separation theorem holds for the optimal allocation of outputs, but does 
not hold for the optimal level of total output in this nonlinear profit model. The 
availability of futures markets encourages the risk averse firm to produce more at home 
except in the upward biased case. Even though futures markets are available to reduce 
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risk, the risk averse firm may produce more or less, depending upon the curvature of the 
marginal revenues. The firm produces more under uncertainty than under certainty with 
linear demands, but less with constant elasticity demands. Regardless of the optimal level 
of total output, however, the risk averse firm benefits fi^om risk in the presence of futures 
markets. In addition, the optimal futures position depends upon the shape of marginal 
revenue curves. For linear demands and unbiased futures markets, the optimal futures 
position is short, and fiill hedging with futures contract only is not attained because the 
indirect profit function is nonlinear in the random exchange rate. 
The MNF currently producing at the home plant decides if it is more profitable to 
open the foreign plant by comparing its expected profits when it opens both plants with 
when it opens only the home plant. Regardless of the expected benefit of the risk neutral 
firm firom opening the foreign plant, the risk averse firm is exposed to exchange rate risk. 
For fixed total output, the risk averse firm will open the foreign plant by selling put 
options that are fairly priced when the risk neutral firm benefits fi-om opening the foreign 
plant. If total output is price responsive, the risk neutral firm is more likely to open the 
foreign plant than in the case of fixed total output because the profit is not less than that 
with fixed total output for every value of the exchange rate. For more reality, I 
investigated how uncertainty affects the firm's behavior if the MNF faces a competitor in 
the foreign market. Employing linear demands, the simulation I performed with the 
uniform distribution shows that if the MNF does not open the foreign plant, both firms 
benefit fi-om risk. However, uncertainty raises the value of opening the foreign plant for 
the MNF, and thus induces the MNF to open it, reducing the expected profit of the local 
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firm under uncertainty. Consequently, the exchange rate variability may help the MNF 
drive the local firm out of business. 
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